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[[Aessage
t is a tremendous honor to have been

chosen as Chair of the Section ofAdmin- H.Russell Frisby
istrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
This Section has traditionally played and will continue to play
an important role in the American Bar Association and the
profession.As a long-time Section member, I will continue
the tradition of principled leadership for which we are
known. I would like to acknowledge the tremendous job that
Michael Asimow did as Chair and congratulate him on a very
successful year. I look forward to working with Bill Luneburg
and Jonathan Rusch and the other Section leaders.
My goal for this year is to promote and facilitate what the
Section does best: examine complex questions and make
reasoned recommendations; educate the profession; and bring
in and encourage the development of younger members.This
will be particularly important given that, regardless of which
candidate wins, a new Administration with new ideas and new
goals will take office in January.
We already have two important reports that will be released
in the fall.The first is the Section's Report to the PresidentElect of the United States ("POTUS Report"). In this report
we will make important recommendations regarding appointments-, preemption, risk management, adjudication and the
need to revive the Administrative Conference of the United
States ("ACUS"). I would like to thank the many Section
members who have participated in the process.
The second report is the Report of the Committee on the
Status and Future of Federal e-Rulemaking entitled "Achieving
the Potential:The Future of Federal e-Rulemaking" ("e-Rulemaking Report").The e-Rulemaking Report proposes
significant improvements to the Federal Government's electronic docket and rulemaking support system. I would like to
thank Sally Katzen and Cynthia Farina for their fine leadership
and the other members of the committee.

Other projects are in the works. However, too often the
Section's reports have not received the attention that they
deserved.We will work closely with the ABA to correct this
and push to have the Section's recommendations implemented.
In particular, now that ACUS has been reauthorized, we will
work to have it funded.
Education is also an important component of the Section's
mission.This fall, thanks to the efforts ofJackYoung and Elizabeth Getman a fifty state election law manual will be released
and will serve as a tremendous resource for the judges who
have to resolve election day disputes.
We also have a very exciting Fall Meeting scheduled October
16 - 18,2008 at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel.Topics range from
Election Law to Immigration, and Government Accountability to CO, Emissions.We will also discuss the POTUS and
e-Rulemaking Reports.
In February we will hold the Annual Homeland Security
Institute and in April we will hold the Annual Administrative
Law Institute. Both will focus on issues and policies of concern
to a new Administration.
This Section has a long history of inclusion.We must
continue this tradition by bringing in young and diverse
attorneys into our ranks, giving them meaningful roles on our
committees, and guiding them through the leadership ranks. I
am particularly looking forward to working with the Section's
Young Lawyers Committee in this effort.
In concluding, I would like to thank Kim Knight and Jenny
Abreu who have moved on to other ABA Sections for their
service to the Section.We are very lucky to have selected Anne
Kiefer as our new director. Anne comes to us from an Illinois
association, with extensive experience as section director and a
background in administration, meetings, membership and technology.We welcome her and look forward to a great year! C.)
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European Union Administrative Law
By Neil Eisner*

Introduction
he European
Union
(EU)
has
become
the locus
of an
extraordinary range of activities that we
in the United States associate with the
field of administrative law.Their activities are of special interest because no
other regulatory regime outside the U.S.
affects American businesses and individuals as regularly and intensively as
the European and no other regulatory
regime constitutes as steady a frame of
reference for comparison with American administrative law processes.As a
result, several years ago, the ABA Section
ofAdministrative Law and Regulatory
Practice initiated an extensive study of
EU administrative law conducted by
a large team of experts put together
by the Section.The research centered
around five subject areas - rulemaking,
adjudication,judicial review, transparency and data protection, and oversight
- that readily enabled comparisons
to U.S. administrative law. During
the study, the Section presented a
number of programs on the subject,
obtained public comment on drafts
of the reporters' research, and participated in ongoing U.S.- EU regulatory
cooperation talks.The Section is now
completing the project with the publication of its report and the presentation
of additional programs.The purpose
of this article is to present a very brief
summary of this multi-volume report.
*Assistant General Counsel for Regulation
and Enforcement, U.S. Dept. ofTransp.; former
Section Chair; and Executive Director of the
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
Section project on European Union administrative law.The author takes no credit for the
substance of this article. He liberally cut-andpasted from the work of the project reporters
- particularly from the "Executive Summary"
by George Bermann and the "Introduction"
by Charles Koch.The author offers many
thanks to the reporters for their excellent, and
very hard, work on this project and especially
to George and Charles for their suggestions
on a draft of this article. For more information
go to http://wwv.abanet.org/adminiaw/eu/
home.html. .This article reflects the findings
and views of the reporters and not the Department ofTransportation.
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EU "Constitutional" Documents

The EU Structure

The basic or "constitutional" documents of the EU have been created by
the various treaties signed by European nations admitted into the Union
(Member States).The first, in 1951,
created the European Coal and Steel
Community, the structure upon which
the current EU is built.Treaties signed in
1957 created the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic
Energy Community.The institutions of
communities were officially merged in
1965 through the "MergerTreaty."These
treaties were consolidated in the Treaty
Establishing the European Community
(TEC).The Treaty of European Union
(TEU) created the "European Union" in

The EU has five key institutions:

See the back
cover to purchase
The Administrative Law
of the European Union
Complete Set!
1992, establishing a structure that pushes
the EU beyond conmercial confederation and toward a true supranational
government.
On December 13,2007, the leaders
of the 27 Member States signed the
"Treaty of Lisbon," which would modify
the institutions, processes and, perhaps,
relationship between the EU and the
governments of the Member States, if
ratified. It would end the distinction
between the "Community" and the
"Union;" make subtle but significant
changes in EU institutions and processes
intended to make EU decision-making
quicker and more transparent with better
democratic controls; and make a few key
structural changes, including a President
who would be elected by the European
Council.The negative results of the June
2008 Irish referendum have placed the
ratification process on hold and the entry
into force of the LisbonTreaty in danger.

" The European Council is made
up of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States and the
President of the Commission, assisted
by the ministers for foreign affairs and
a Member of the Conmission.The
European Council provides general
political guidelines. Its presidency
rotates among the Member States
every six months.

" The Council of the European
Union (Council) exercises, along
with the European Parliament, final
legislative authority. Each Member
State is represented on the Council
by a minister, determined by the
subject matter under consideration,
who is authorized to commit his or
her government.The Council has its
own General Secretariat staffed by
permanent officials, which is divided
into Directorates-General.The Council's work is prepared or coordinated

by the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COREPER).
COREPER is made up of senior
national officials and to some extent
represents the national governments.
It exercises largely invisible power well
beyond its formal status. Indeed, it is
commonly believed that 90 percent
of Council matters are decided by
COREPER before Council meetings and are waived through by the
Council.

The European Commission is
the hub of the EU,having significant
legislative powers along with most
of the administrative responsibilities.
Acting collectively (as the "College
of Commissioners") it is directly
involved in legislative and regulatory
policy-making, initiating legislation and playing an important role
throughout the legislative process.
The Commission also implements
EU policies through its Secretariat
General and its departments known as

continued on next page
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Directorates-General, each of which
is responsible for a specific policy area.
There are also a number of specialized
services, most prominent being Legal
Service, which gives legal advice to all
Directorates-General and represents
the Commission in legal proceedings.
If the heads of the DirectoratesGeneral reach unanimous agreement
on a question, their decision is
normally adopted by the Commission
without debate.
" The European Parliament is the
only directly elected institution, and
its consent is needed for the passage
of most EU legislation. It also must
approve the membership of the
Commission and may call for the
Commission's resignation. Representation is based on a Member State's
population.
" The European Court ofJustice
(ECJ) and the subordinate Court
of First Instance (CFI) are vested
with the EUjudicial power.With a
few notable exceptions, actions are
filed and adjudicated in the CFI, with
appeals to the ECJ available on issues
of law only.There are no EU courts
equivalent to "inferior" U.S. federal
courts, so Member State courts are an
integrated part of the European judicial apparatus.
The reporters noted the recent emergence of a variety of EU agencies with
special mandates and processes. European agencies have increased from four
in 1993 to twenty-two in 2007 and are
expected to continue to increase.

Rulemaking
Because the EU and its Member States
mainly have parliamentary-style governments, the stark separation present in
the U.S. between legislative and executive policy-making is absent.The four
levels of EU "legislation," in descending
order, are the treaties, which create basic
law, somewhat comparable to the U.S.
Constitution; "statutory-like documents"
generally comparable to U.S. statutes;
"delegated legislation," administrative
rules having the force of law that might
be considered comparable to U.S."legislative rules," and "soft law," the equivalent
in function and variety to U.S. guidance
documents.
Administrative and Regulatory Law News

There are three types of formal legislation. Regulations most resemble U.S.
statutes.They have binding force directly
on persons, without further action by
the Member States. In contrast, directives
are binding on the Member States only
and each Member State must take some
action for them to affect others. Directives are often framework legislation and
hence allow Member States freedom in
the implementation of EU law.They may
require Member States to harmonize
their laws. Decisions are binding only on
those named, implying individual action.
However,"collective decisions" may have
some general application.
As noted, legislative authority is
divided among three institutions: the
Commission, the Council, and Parliament.Technically, legislation must be
proposed by the Commission. In reality,
the Member States control the legislative
agenda through a complicated interplay among the European Council, the
Council, and the State holding the rotating Council Presidency.The Council
considers the Commission's proposal
and sends it to Parliament. Parliament
considers the proposal and interacts with
the Council and the Commission in
finalizing the legislation. Increasingly, the
Council and Parliament share the power
of adoption.
The Commission's proposals are based
on extensive study and consultation,
leading our reporters to observe:"The
European process may have succeeded
to some extent in severing politics from
policy analysis at the legislative level,
and having developed an unusually
interactive and transparent process for
submitting comments to the Commission'" The Commission engages its
own experts and selects outside experts
to study its proposals.There also are a
variety of opportunities for interests
inside and outside Europe to participate
in the legislative process.A significant
feature is that consultation occurs well
before the Commission's policy preferences have taken firm shape resistant to
change, but the specific and structured
process may inhibit a spontaneous and
free-wheeling exchange of views and
opinions.
There are no clear boundaries
between statutory-like legislation and

delegated legislation. Indeed, the process
for formulating statutory-like proposals
is more like the U.S. rulemaking process
than the U.S. legislative process.
As in all modern governments, the
EU relies on its bureaucracy to provide
the implementing detail for delegated
legislation, which may be issued in three
ways. First, the Commission may receive
delegated authority, which was more
prevalent in early EU legislation. Second,
the Council may have the authority
based on a proposal from the Commission.Third, the Commission may act
under the indirect control of the Council
through supervisory committees under
"comitology" procedures; the Council
becomes involved only if the Conmmission and the appropriate committee
cannot agree.
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of
the European "rulemaking" process is
the comitology process.The committees
represent, at a minimum, fora for discussion and dialogue and are divided into
five types that have varying degrees of
power to influence the decision-making.
They may harness expert knowledge
and advice outside the Commission, but
they are also a channel for the exertion of
Member State influence.
The EU also has various devices
for creating soft law, which creates the
same conundrum between the value of
efficient advice and absence of public
procedures.The Commission has a menu
of soft law devices. Chief among these
is perhaps "communications," which are
sent to other institutions, particularly the
Council or Parliament.They may have
considerable impact. "Guidance notes"
explain how Member States or the regulatory community should interpret and
apply an EU measure."Action plans" set
out objectives, principles, and priorities.
"Resolutions" are political statements by
the Council or the Parliament that have
no basis in the Treaties.
The reporters conclude that the
Commission has worked hard, and
to a considerable extent succeeded, at
developing innovative governance tools
and producing transparent administrative processes.The concern is that some
of the processes are not legislatively
mandated orjudicially enforceable.
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Adjudication
Most individual decision-making (in
the U.S. sense) predicated on EU law is
conducted at the Member State level.
There are sectors, however- such as
competition law and food safety - where
decisions may be made at the EU level,
generally by the Commission (where
the decisions are prepared by the responsible Directorates-General), but in some
exceptional cases by an EU specialized
administrative agency.There is no single
procedural model. Each sector has its
own.
Some sectors are noteworthy for
highly intrusive investigations, including
unannounced site visits, while others rely
heavily on the exchange and examination of documents.Although a "hearing"
of some sort is available, the nature of
the hearing may vary and is uneven
across the sectors.There is no generalized
opportunity for reconsideration of decisions.The typical remedy is review in the
EU courts. Despite the differences, some
important themes emerge, including
the requirement that all individualized decisions must state the factual and
legal reasons for the decision, providing
enough detail for effective judicial review.
The reporters conclude the EU
decision-makers follow a predominantly
"inquisitorial" model - designed to
produce and ultimately justify a decision.
Accordingly, they entail much less of the
structured and formal presentation of
evidence and its countering found in the
U.S. adversarial model.At the same time,
the EU courts have stressed that a condition of validity for decisions is the basic
"right to be heard."
In some sectors, the hearings leading
to an individual decision may be
conducted by the same personnel who
participated in, and may have led, the
investigation.This is undergoing some
change, however.
Despite the differences from the U.S.
system, the reporters conclude that "there
is an abundance of process and ... in
most cases a substantial opportunity to
represent an interest."

Judicial Review
Most judicial enforcement of EU law
takes place in the courts of the Member
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States, though a "preliminary reference"
system enables them to secure from the
ECJ authoritative rulings on the meaning
and validity of EU law measures. Even so,
the EU courts offer an elaborate system
ofjudicial recourse. EU institutions,
Member States, and private parties with
standing can challenge the validity of
legal acts of general application taken by
the EU in the EU courts.The reporters,
however, have special criticism for the
strictness of the standing criteria (which
could be substantially relaxed under the
Lisbon Treaty). Parties to whom individual decisions are addressed (and others
to whom they are of direct and individual concern) can also challenge those
decisions in the EU courts. EU institutions may be challenged for "inaction"
as well as "action." In contrast to the U.S.
system, the EU courts give officials much
less deference on interpretative questions. On the other hand, in conducting
their review, they instinctively feel more
constrained by legislative language than
U.S. courts. (The existence of multiple
authoritative language texts may create
problems for statutory construction.)
However, the EU courts engage in more
policy analysis than they would if they
followed the traditional standards of the
continental judiciary.
The EU Commission plays a prosecutorial role in the ECJ, where it can
bring "enforcement" or "infringement"
actions against Member States (after the
Commission and the State concerned
have failed to resolve their differences in
an elaborate administrative procedure).
The introduction of the possibility
of fines against a recalcitrant State is
reported to have introduced a new and
important incentive to compliance.
The dominant standard of review is
"proportionality."This standard is used
throughout continental Europe and is
even migrating into the review of the
common law Member States. Simply
stated, a reviewing court assures that the
governmental measure is proportionate
to the problem it seeks to remedy. It is
often applied, for example, to Member
State regulations; a justifiable health or
safety regulation may be struck down if
the court identifies alternatives that pose
less risk to the single market.The "subsidiarity" principle declares EU legislation

within fields of concurrent competence
permissible only where the relevant
objective is in fact "better achieved by
the Community" and "cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States,"
though the justiciability of this principle
is questionable.
Member State courts may be required
(depending on the stage of the proceeding) to refer a question to the European
Court of'Justice on the proper interpretation and occasionally the validity of an
EU law instrument.

Transparency and
Data Protection
The reporters were highly impressed
with the dissemination of information
by EU institutions.The websites of the
Commission, the Parliament, and the
Council offer a wealth of information
that is highly accessible, well-organized,
well-presented, and rather easily navigable. Public access to specifically requested
documents is more nuanced.The legally
enforceable right of access, subject to
exemptions, covers a broad range of
documents without a requirement to
show interest or need, and subject to
a short deadline. Although the system
is clearly workable, the reporters note
trouble spots.The Member States, for
example, may request that documents
originating with them not be disclosed,
even if in the files of an EU institution.
In addition, the institutions have no
discretionary authority to release exempt
documents.
Administrative appeals may be brought
by those challenging decisions to grant
or deny access. Further appeals may
be taken to the EU courts or to an
Ombudsman, who can attempt to reconcile the parties or issue a non-binding
recommendation (but to which the institution is required to reply).
The requirements for consultation with third parties over whether
to disclose documents are complex.
However, there is strong personal data
privacy protection in place, which
provides more of a limitation on disclosure
than exists in the U.S.
Strong privacy protection requirements
extend to the Member States, which must
also put in place and enforce protections

continued on page 17
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An Abridged Global Viewpoint on
Environmental Permitting:
The UK Integrated Permitting Regime
By Lisa E. Comer*
regime and its respective cultural
he
integrated permitting
framework
organizational
andUK
presents an interesting counterpoint to
the US media-specific environmental
permitting approach and practice.This
article offers an introductory glimpse
into the UK environmental permitting
scheme, highlighting several aspects
of the UK permitting framework and
briefly describing the cultural setting
and modern regulatory strategy in the
UK. It assumes a general knowledge of
the United States' domestic environmental regulatory structure, but may be
of interest to practitioners in other fields
as well.
The contextual narrative that follows
is largely drawn from and attributable to
a recently-issued report exploring the
European Union (EU) Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (IPPC) directive
and specifically the UK implementation
of that directive under the Environment
Agency (EA) that has jurisdiction in
England andWales.That report, issued
by the US EPA's National Center for
Environmental Innovation (NCEI), An
In-depth Look at the United Kingdom Integrated Permitting System (NCEI report),
is intended to encourage and stimulate
dialogue on the potential testing and
application of innovative permitting
practices in the US. (It is available online
at www.epa.gov/permits/integrated.
* Ms. Comer is an attorney with the National
Center of Environmental Innovation, US
Environmental Protection Agency, and one of
several principal authors of the report discussed
in this article. Any inconsistencies or errors in
this article's description of the UK integrated

permitting regime are the author's sole
responsibility.
The PPC regulations were recently superseded by a new body of "Environmental
Permitting" (EP) regulations; however these
do not fundamentally alter the operation of
the UK permitting system or affect the findings of the EPA report.
Administrative and Regulatory Law News

htm) The conclusion to this article
discusses possible benefits of considering an integrated permitting system in
the US, and its potential for informing
regulatory and permitting innovation;
these conclusions represent the author's
personal opinion and do not necessarily
reflect current or anticipated EPA policy.

UK Integrated Permitting
Framework and Environmental
Regulatory Practice in Brief
In a nutshell, the UK environmental permitting scheme is defined by its
comprehensive integrated approach
embracing an ultimate goal of sustainability. (In contrast, consider the
media-based, compliance-driven
permitting system of the US). Officially
mandated by the EU IPPC Directive of 1996, the integrated permitting
regime establishes as its primary objective achieving a high level of protection
for the environment as a whole - by first
preventing emissions to air, water, and
soil; and then, where prevention is not
practicable, controlling emissions. The
UK translation of the IPPC directive, the
Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC)
Act of 1999 and accompanying regulations, adopts a pollution-prevention,
multi-media permitting approach that
relies on facility-wide footprint assessments of all environmental impacts.The
PPC law and its underlying regulations
provide the framework for issuing integrated permits in England andWales.t
The PPC law has been implemented
so as to incorporate compliance and
enforcement, monitoring and reporting,
sector management and communication, and public notice and participation
in one regulatory construct. In a very
general sense, the EU IPPC Directive
can be analogized to US federal environmental laws and the UK PPC Act to
US state laws promulgated to support

the authorization or delegation of federal
programs to states.
The UK permitting system is implemented using a sector-strategy and
risk-based approach.A number of
industry sectors are covered by the
IPPC system including manufacturers
of pulp and paper, organic fine cheniicals, pharmaceuticals, food and drink,
textile treatment, and operators of largescale intensive livestock production and
hazardous waste landfills. For the most
part, each sector has its own set of guidance documents regarding the "best
available techniques" (BAT) for prevention or control of pollution in that sector.
In addition, threshold criteria trigger
IPPC applicability for the covered industries.That is,the IPPC system does not
apply to all facilities:A set of criteria are
used to determine whether a UK facility
must apply for an IPPC permit based on
its potential for causing pollution.The
PPC regulations set forth these specific
factors on a sector basis, including the
type of facility operation, the production level, the kind and nature of the
pollutant emitted, and the amount of the
pollutant emitted. Under the IPPC, the
consideration of the relative complexity and pollution potential of a facility's
activities provides a classification scheme
(e.g., Parts A and B) for UK facilities that
is similar to the US designation of major
and minor sources.
An IPPC integrated permit consolidates into one facility permit all of the
environmental impacts typically covered
by US media-specific permits and regulations (e.g., authorized by the Clean
Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act) and
also includes a number of provisions not
found in most US permits. In short, an
IPPC permit addresses a comprehensive
set of pollution controls (e.g., air emissions, releases to water, waste handling
and disposal), resource use (e.g., energy
Volume 34, Number 1

efficiency, water and raw materials inputs,
waste minimization), and both immediate and long-term practices and effects
of facility operation (e.g., noise, vibration,
and odor factors; environmental management techniques or environmental
management system use; reporting and
monitoring; site restoration, as well as
other considerations).
Lastly, of notable interest to the legal
scholar, the PPC Act functions as an
umbrella statute.That is, the PPC law
itself allows for the absorption and
application of existing and evolving regulatory mandates (issued both
by the EU and the UK) and supports
consideration of new and improved
environmental protection techniques
over time.As new legislation is issued
by the EU, for instance, the UK is able
to incorporate corresponding requirements into the PPC national framework
without promulgating new national
law. Moreover, the PPC legal authority
is far less prescriptive and detailed than
corresponding legal authorities in the
US. Even the PPC regulations do not
contain the complex detail of many US
statutes. Often underlying guidance is
used to detail the application of specific
legal requirements.The overarching legal
framework in the UK results in a greater
capacity to expeditiously address new

issues.The UK's fluid, comprehensive
legal arrangement lies in stark contrast to
the US federal pollution control system
consisting of independent, stove-piped,
media-specific, dense, and relatively static
(over the last 30 years) environmental
statutory edicts.

A Few Comparative Highlights of
the UK Integrated Approach
In addition to the noteworthy characteristics of the UK system described
above, what follows are a few comparative highlights selected among many
described in greater detail in the NCEI
report.
The UK integrated system uses a
single standard-setting concept to set
limits and address pollution prevention
and sustainability.The central component
of an IPPC permit is the application of
the common standard Best Available
Techniques (BAT).The UK BAT is
broader and more encompassing than
Fall, 2008

the familiar-sounding terms employed
in US statutes, such as, the Best Available
Technology standard under the Clean
Water Act. UK BAT standards apply to
all facility activities that have environmental impacts.Thus, in determining
UK BAT standards, factors include not
only pollution control methods, but also
pollution prevention considerations such
as technological and scientific advances
in production practices and resource
efficiency considerations. Details on how
to determine UK BAT conditions for
a facility are contained in non-binding
UK guidance documents.This guidance
allows UK regulatory authorities to exercise additional technical discretion when
setting permit conditions.
In applying BAT, the UK IPPC
permit system allows for flexibility and
input by industry on a site-specific
basis. BAT standards are tailored to fit
facility-specific operational conditions
(e.g., technology and equipment in
use) and location-specific conditions
(e.g., surrounding geographic and environmental). Generally speaking, IPPC
permitting synchronizes local and facility-specific conditions and sector-wide
considerations. In addition, where a UK
facility seeking a permit is not operating
at appropriate BAT levels, improvement
programs may be included in the permit
to move the facility towards (and as
close as possible to) the applicable BAT
standards. On the other hand, some UK
facilities are capable of achieving or even
going beyond BAT standards specific to
certain aspects of facility operation and
may be required to do so.
The IPPC system holds both regulators and permit-holders accountable
for continual improvement. Both the
UK EA and industry have an ongoing
responsibility to keep up with the latest
developments and improvements in
BAT.This knowledge may be directly
applied to permit terms. For instance,
since IPPC permit conditions include
the implementation of environmental
management systems of some nature and
scrutiny of material inputs, operators are
required to continually seek opportunities for performance improvement and
sustainability. In this way, an IPPC permit
reflects current performance at a facility while also encouraging continual

improvement.This contrasts with a US
facility that (permitted to meet certain
standards and legally stay in compliance)
has little motivation for moving beyond
what is required.

British Culture and Modern
Regulatory Strategy
The UK cultural backdrop sets the
stage for the integrated permitting
approach and differs noticeably from the
more adversarial regulatory and enforcement culture in the US.The UK culture
is the foundation for a collegial partnership between the governing regulatory
authority and the regulated community.
The cooperative relationship relies on
continuing dialogue and institutionalized consensus-building between the
UK EA and industries covered under the
IPPC. Since an operator knows more
about a facility than does the regulator, an operator is obligated to assess the
environmental effects of a facility, identify
ways to prevent and then control pollution, and propose permit conditions in an
IPPC permit application for review by
the regulator. Integral to the permitting
application process is the Environmental
Protection Operator and Pollution Risk
Appraisal (EP OPRA) screening tool.
An operator is required to submit an
EP OPRA profile and score with any
IPPC permit application.The OPRA
screening tool provides a measure of
the potential harm a facility can cause.
This approximate risk information is
used for planning and managing internal
EA workload and resources, monitoring operations, targeting inspections,
and setting permit fees. In determining
a facility permit, the EA considers the
technical information from the permit
application (along with any comments
received from the public or statutory
consultees).The final permit incorporates
all BAT/permit conditions and also
includes an assessment of elements for
an improvement program (where
necessary).
The operator and regulator work
virtually hand-in-hand through the
permit application process.Actually,
this partnership begins in the development stages of the permit application,
continued on next page
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continues through permit issuance, and
lasts throughout the effective life of the
permit.As a whole, UK industry plays
a significant role influencing sectorbased planning and priority-setting and
informing sector-wide indicators and
performance targets. Not only does this
collaborative approach capitalize on the
relative expertise of and input by the
relevant industry sector, it also benefits
from the extensive experience of many
EA permit writers and officials and the
corresponding high-level of public trust
seemingly inherent in British culture.
This culture of collaboration and trust
is also reflected in UK enforcement practices.While the PPC law supports formal
enforcement procedures, such actions
are employed much less frequently
than in the US. Instead, the EA tends to
rely on a setting of real-time notification and information-sharing; mutual
cooperation and communication; and
a collective, iterative, problem-solving
mindset. It can be said that the UK views
its primary objective as ensuring the
safety and protection of the environment
and public health rather than punishing polluters - that is, using the minimal
amount of formal regulation necessary to
achieve compliance. And, in a complementary manner, the UK system shifts
the burden of responsibility for environmental performance to a facility operator.
In the UK, each IPPC facility has the
duty of assessing (overall) environmental
impacts and identifying and continually
improving conditions to prevent and
control resulting pollution and other
environmental effects.
In essence, the UK system draws on
an iterative, inclusive, and fluid style of
administrative governance. Interestingly,
the UK touts its system as more than just
integrated permitting:The UK modern
integrated regulatoryscheme supports the
creation of risk-based, results-focused,
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consistent, and transparent regulation.
This modern or responsive regulation
style also allows for the EA's proportionate and balanced approach to compliance:
rewarding good performance, driving
environmental improvements and
corrections where necessary, and taking
strong measures where warranted. Under
this government-wide approach, the
EA is employed as the single institution
(for England andWales) responsible for
environmental regulation, including
compliance and enforcement, sector
management and communication, along
with permitting. Moreover, the concept
of modern regulation and the single UK
PPC system has made it relatively easy
for the UK to incorporate and implement the regular tide of EU-issued
environmental legislation.

Conclusion: Will the US
Be Drowned by the Tide or
Ride the Wave?
Obviously, under examination, any
permitting approach (integrated or
media-specific included) has benefits
and barriers. Practically since its inception, a myriad of voices both public and
private have opined on the pros and
cons of the US environmental permitting system. Indeed, over the years, there
has even been experimentation with
multi-media or integrated approaches
to permitting in the US. Recognizing
that a wholesale transition to integrated
permitting is not advisable in the US
at this time, the momentous expansion
of integrated permitting overseas at the
very least invites speculation about the
potential of such an approach. Moreover, economic globalization, increasing
world-wide competition, and dwindling
natural resources may create incentives
for looking for improvements to the US
environmental protection strategy. Could
it be that our current permitting system

is keeping American companies from

competing on a level playing field with
other industrialized nations?
At a conceptual level, there do appear
to be a variety of possible advantages
to considering an integrated permitting and regulatory model. In general
terms, a few potential benefits of an
integrated approach include creating
efficiencies for both administrative and
procedural processes; instilling a comprehensive, problem-solving foundation
that supports the quest for (continually) improved controls for multi-media
environmental impacts; and advancing
pollution prevention and sustainability
concepts and practices.At a minimum,
in light of the growing global economy,
the IPPC's ultimate goal of sustainability
offers one reason to look to our continental contemporaries for inspiration.
Ultimately, if the US were to fully
embrace an integrated system, legislative change would be necessary. Short of
that, however, integrated methodologies
and tools (such as the UK sector-wide
BAT concept and EP OPRA tool) may
offer ideas for improving working conditions and environmental performance
within the current permitting system.
Given current national predicaments, US
policymakers and the public alike might
be willing to consider innovative ideas
reflective of an integrated approach; for
it appears that America's once-enjoyed
economic dominance, if not vanished
already, exists in a particularly perilous
state. In an effort to bring fresh perspectives and thinking to today's challenges,
the NCEI report and continuing collaborative effort is a foundation for further
research, dialogue, and possible expansion
of the US integrated experience.These
opportunities may lead to improvements
in the US system overall and even help
to uncover solutions for emerging
environmental concerns both here
and abroad. C.)
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Can Law Manage Energy Markets?
By David B. Spence*

The Problem
hortly after
the
electric
and the
gas creation
industriesofmore
than a century ago, policymakers in Europe and the United States
concluded that both industries were
natural monopolies for which competition was inappropriate due to their
large econonies of scale, or decreasing
marginal and average costs across a very
large range of output.
In Europe, state-owned firms were
the norm prior to the late 1980s, and
they remain common in the developing
world. In the United States, the public
utility model was dominant: governments licensed private firms as monopoly
suppliers, regulating wholesale and retail
rates and conditions of service. In the
1970s, economists began to challenge
the notion that the provision of energy
service is a natural monopoly at all.While
energy transmission and distribution may
be a natural monopoly, the sale of energy
delivered over such a system is not.
Competition in energy sales should
eventually weed out those who cannot
provide reliable service at a competitive
price, and consumers - broadly defined
to include all consumer classes - should
benefit from the cost discipline competition brings. Consequently, in the 19 80s
and early 1990s a series oflegislative and
regulatory initiatives in the United States
and Europe mandated the unbundling
of wholesale sales and distribution in the
gas and electric industries, transforming networks from middlemen selling
bundled energy (sales and delivery)
services, on the one hand, into "common
carriers" providing only delivery services
to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis,
on the other.A sizeable minority of U.S.
states followed suit, restructuring their
retail markets. Collectively, these changes
have led to the development of robust
* Associate Professor, Law, Politics &Regulation, McCombs School of Business, University
ofTexas at Austin.This is an abridged version
of the article that appeared in 93 CORNELL L.
R-v. 765 (2008).
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wholesale markets in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Scandanavia,
France/Belgium, and various parts of
central Europe.
While there is some disagreement
about the particular effects of restructuring on prices, restructuring has not
brought the kind of general decline in
energy prices across customer classes that
many expected. Prices remain high in
many places, and large price disparities
persist across regions. Some analysts
ascribe the bulk of the problem to
increases in the cost of inputs; others
ascribe high prices to the problem of too
few sellers chasing too many customers, a
problem which can offer those few sellers
the opportunity to exert market power
over prices.

The European Commission's Competition Directorate concluded in 2006
that incumbent firm market power had
inhibited the development of energy
markets there. In Europe, the problem of
access for new market entrants to energy,
and to the delivery system, is particularly
acute, partly because European markets
are less well developed in some places,
and partly because of the absence of an
energy regulator with direct authority to
address it. In any case, both American and
European market rules prohibit the abuse
of market power and require transparency and nondiscrimination in the sale
of network services.Yet these problems
of incumbent market power and high
prices persist.Why?

Politics vs. Economics
restructuring is nearing
a crossroads, one at which
market skeptics and market
proponents will have to
confront one another
more openly
The destructive role played by sellers
who abused market power in California's
electricity market is well-known.A
supply-demand imbalance and cost
factors were a large part of the problem
in California, but regulators determined
that the state's poorly-designed market
also created easy opportunities for sellers
to exert market power over price, and to
otherwise "game" the system.
While the California market was
uniquely susceptible to the acquisition
and abuse of market power, some version
of this problem can arise in any market
where there are sufficiently few sellers
and/or sufficiently small supply margins,
and American and European regulators
remain concerned about abuses of
market power.

Politically, the restructuring of energy
markets has been a top-down affair, both
in Europe and the United States. In both
locations restructuring has been driven
by elites: primarily, regulators convinced
of the benefits of markets and industrial
users who stood to benefit from competition. Most elected politicians favored
restructuring as long as restructuring did
not result in price increases.
Thus, there is a clear tension between
the economic rationale for restructuring
energy markets and its political rationale.
The economic rationale for restructuring
takes a long view, arguing that regardless
of their distributional and short-term
impacts, markets will bring Kaldor-Hicks
improvements in the long run.The political rationale, by contrast, seeks Pareto
improvements, and is focused on the very
distributional and short-term impacts
that the economic rationale shoves aside.
Energy markets cannot survive politically if their benefits accrue to a minority
at the expense of the majority; nor can
they survive if their long term net benefits entail unacceptably high short-term
costs. On the other hand, in order for
energy markets to work as intended, the

continued on next page
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distribution of benefits and costs must
necessarily be uneven across buyers and
sellers, and over time. It is over these two
dimensions of restructuring - the distribution of impacts across customer classes,
and the distribution of impacts over time
- that the tension between restructuring's
economic and political rationales must
be reconciled.
Over the long run, new entrants (or
the threat of new entrants) should lower
the costs of producing and supplying
energy, all else equal. However, in some
markets new entrants have difficulty
acquiring and delivering energy. Assuming that hurdle can be overcome,
prospective entrants will also require
some assurance that they can sell their
energy at prices sufficient to recover their
costs and earn a competitive return on
investment. However, it is not clear that
existing energy markets offer prospective
entrants that assurance. Future market
prices are notoriously difficult to predict.
New entrants must project their own
cost curves, the cost curves of competing technologies, and the future demand
curve. Furthermore, there is the additional possibility that regulators may cap
prices in the future.
Consider the prospective builder of
a gas-fired electric plant, one that will
provide power only during periods of
peak demand. Its success in the market
will depend upon its ability to sell energy
(and earn revenues) only when prices
(and demand) are high.Will politicians
and regulators allow owners of energy
to capture scarcity rents when energy
is scarce?
In both the United States and Europe,
many jurisdictions have imposed price
caps during the transition to competition, and beyond, and retain the power
to outlaw rates that are too high. Neither
European nor American regulators have
articulated a clear distinction between
price spikes caused by the (impermissible) exercise of market power and price
spikes caused by the (permissible) capture
of scarcity rents; indeed, there may not
be one.
However, new entrants know that
politicians and regulators would prefer
to protect customers, particularly vulnerable customers, from high rates. Ironically,
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if companies choose not to enter the
market for these reasons, energy remains
scarce, putting continuing upward pressure on price.Thus, regulators face a
conundrum: in restructured markets,
the very problem that undermines
political support for restructuring - price
volatility - is made more likely by the
techniques used to protect customers
from it.

The Need for Policy
Transparency
Both American and European regulators remain dedicated to the economic
imperatives of letting markets work,
while their political overseers remain
dedicated to the political imperative of
protecting consumers from high prices.
This state of affairs cannot continue.
Even in efficient markets, prices
will not decline monotonically: to the
contrary, they will move in both directions, reflecting the forces of supply and
demand. By papering over these essential
truths, the path to competition did not
offer policymakers or their constituents
the opportunity to choose between the
efficiency and uncertainty of market
prices, on the one hand, and the inefficiency and certainty of regulated
prices, on the other. Hence, restructuring is nearing a crossroads, one at which
market skeptics and market proponents
will have to confront one another more
openly. It is not clear whether energy
markets can satisfy their economic and
political imperatives simultaneously.
Any sincere attempt to bring market
efficiency to energy markets must
include five essential elements, many of
which seem politically risky. First,politicians and regulators must make a credible
commitment not to impose limits on the movement of energy prices in the absence of collusive
orfraudulent behavior.In other words,
when scarcity drives prices high, politicians and regulators need to let the price
signal work to attract new entrants into
the market.
Second, designers of restructuredmarkets
should ensure that buyers on wholesale and
retail markets have available to them every tool
they needto hedge price risk. For buyers on
wholesale markets (that is,retail sellers)
that means that regulators should not

restrict their use of the full portfolio of
energy contracts, including the purchase
of energy using long-term contracts (to
lock in energy purchases at a fixed price)
and the purchase of energy derivative
contracts to protect themselves (and their
customers) against price risk.
Third,politicians must assist regulators'
efforts to broaden the geographicalscope of
energy planning.The European Commission's efforts to enhance cross-border
energy trade and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's efforts to
encourage regional transmission planning are good first steps, but are only first
steps. Some underinvestment in energy
production and transmission capacity
is the result of nothing more than local
unwillingness to accept the costs associated with hosting the capacity.When
regulatory jurisdiction is balkanized, as
it is in capacity siting in both the United
States and Europe, local opposition can
lead to significant underinvestment in
new capacity.
Fourth, market designers need to enhance
demand response by letting retail customers see,
and respond to, the effects of very short-term
price changes. Things like time-of-day rates
and real-time metering communicate
to customers the time-value of using
power during different times of day and
year.When customers voluntarily shave
the peaks off of demand, fewer peaking
plants need to be built, and satisfying
load becomes a cheaper proposition for
retailers.
Thefifth andfinal element of a market
solution is to subsidize needy customers when
prices exceed their ability to pay. It would be
far better to subsidize those customers'
payments than to simply cap prices, or to
ascribe impermissible market power to
sellers in such situations.
This portfolio of policies seems politically ambitious, to say the least. If it is
politically unacceptable, we ought to ask
ourselves why that is.Without such policies, energy markets have little chance
to realize the long-term efficiencies
promised to voters. If voters' democratically-elected representatives prefer to
shield voters from the truth about how
markets work, then those elected representatives ought to rethink their support
for markets in the first place. C>
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Why the Filed Rate Doctrine Should
Not Imply Blanket Judicial Deference
to Regulatory Agencies
By Jim Rossi*
doctrine of public utility regulahe filed
rate doctrine
is a venerable
tion.
Federal
courts applying
the
doctrine frequently defer to the regulatory agency and refuse to consider the
merits of alleged violations of antitrust,
tort or contract claims where resolution
would require a departure from a filed
rate.
For over a century, the filed rate
doctrine has served many important
purposes. However, with increased attention to market-based approaches to
electric power, natural gas and telecommunications regulation, there is reason
to question both the doctrine's continued applicability and usefilness.At a
minimum, as markets are deregulated, the
traditional principles of deference which
courts applied in this context need to be
reassessed.

A Little History and Context
Under the filed rate doctrine, a utility
was prohibited from offering customers rebates and discounts that are at odds
with the filed tariff, which historically
reflected a regulator's careful evaluation
and affirmative approval of costs and
prices. In addition to furthering the noneconomic goal of fairness, prohibiting
price discrimination limited a monopolist's ability to use its market power to
extend its monopoly into secondary
markets.The doctrine served two additional important purposes in historically
regulated industries.
* Harry M.Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean of Research, Florida State University
College of Law. The article is adapted and
condensed from earlier publications, includingJim Rossi, Lowering the FiledTariff Shield:
Judicial Enforcement in the DeregulatoryEra, 56
VANDERBILT L. R.v. 1591, 1598-1601 (2003)
and Debilitating Doctrine: How the Filed Rate
DoctrineWreaks Havoc on Deregulated Energy
Markets .. And "hat Courts Can Do About It,
PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY,

2004, at 16-21.
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First, where a federal court is asked to
apply substantive state law, as often occurs
in a fraud or breach of contract claim,
there is a federal preemption strand to
the filed rate doctrine. For example, the
filed rate doctrine barred California's
governor from commandeering expensive wholesale power contracts during
the state's recent deregulation crisis.
Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L. L. C. v.
Davis, 267 E3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001).The
Ninth Circuit reasoned the state's action
would present a conflict with a tariff filed
with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) - at bottom a
legal determination of federal preemption.
Second, and especially relevant to
judicial consideration of federal antitrust
claims, there is a longstanding agency
deference strand to the doctrine. Keogh
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,
260 U.S. 156 (1922), held that a private
antitrust plaintiff is precluded from recovering treble damages against a carrier
based on the claim that a tariff filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission
was allegedly monopolistic.Justice
Brandeis invoked a deference rationale,
reasoning that the complex and technical
issue of rates is best determined by the
agency, not by a court.

Regulatory Gaps in Newly
Restructured Markets
The filed rate doctrine has been used
to bar antitrust claims in the deregulated electric power industry. In Town of
Nonvood v. New England Power Co., 202
E3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000), the Keogh strand
of the filed rate doctrine was invoked to
bar a price squeeze claim against a utility
- even where the tariff filed with FERC
was based on competitively set prices.
The Norwood court reasoned,"[i]t is the
filing of the tariffs, and not any affirmative approval or scrutiny by the agency,

that triggers the filed rate doctrine. "Id.
at 419.
However, as energy supply markets are
deregulated, blanket deference to regulators under the filed rate doctrine is akin
to pounding"a square peg into a round
hole." Richard Stavros, Lost in Translation:
Critics Say FERC'sFiled Rate Doctrineis
Wrongfor the Times, PUBLIC UTILITIES
FORTNIGHTLY,June 2004, at 4. One
commonly articulated concern with the
filed rate doctrine in competitive markets
is that, by valuing regulatory over market
price determinations, it stands in the way
of competitive markets.
In addition, the filed rate doctrine may
have the unintended consequence of
encouraging strategic actions on the part
of firms in the regulatory process with a
purpose of limiting judicial involvement
in the resolution of conflicts. If firms can
opt out ofjudicial remedies merely by
filing broad tariffs with regulators, this
encourages a type of private manipulation of the regulatory process absent any
third party oversight.
As regulators implement competition policy for formerly rate-regulated
services,judicial enforcement of remedies
for market abuses based on violations
of antitrust, tort and contract law can
play an important role in protecting
public welfare.While courts do not have
the same degree of expertise that an
agency possesses, courts do have some
comparative institutional competence
in implementing enforcement regimes
that could benefit competitive markets.
Unlike regulatory agencies, courts do not
depend on budget allocations or legislative delegations of specific regulatory
jurisdiction. Courts have wider remedial
authority and discovery powers than do
regulatory agencies, and also have greater
political independence.
continued on next page
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Overbroad application of the filed
rate doctrine is especially inappropriate
where regulators have limited jurisdiction. For example, in 2004, a U.S. district
court in Texas applied the filed rate
doctrine to preclude antitrust claims for
illegal conduct in deregulated wholesale
power markets against numerous power
supply companies. Texas Commercial
Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 2004-2 Trade
Cases 74,497, Util. L. Rep. 14,512
(S.D.Tex. 2004), affd 413 F3d 503 (5th
Cir. 2005). In declining to consider the
merits of the antitrust claims, the court
reasoned that the agency charged by
the state legislature with overseeing the
Texas electricity market, the Texas Public
Utilities Comnission (TPUC), possesses
the "institutional competence to address
rate-making issues in the [] market, one
of the principles underlying the filed rate
doctrine." However, a regulator could
only possess institutional competence if
it also has the authority to act; at the time
Texas had no express or implied private
right of action for injured purchasers, and
TPUC also lacked authority to order
refunds and damages.
To the extent courts allow the mere
filing of tariffs to presumptively determine whether a court will entertain
the merits of claims of anticompetitive
conduct, the filed rate doctrine invites
even more radical deregulation than
either Congress or the regulatory agencies accepting tariffs would prefer - that
is, markets absent antitrust and common
law remedies. Surely, Congress did not
intend this in the Federal Power Act
or in subsequent energy legislation.
To the extent the filed rate doctrine
privileges private choice over assessment of the public interest in choosing
the mechanism for enforcement, courts
should refuse to apply it automatically to
preclude judicial enforcement.

How Other Legal Doctrines
Further the Filed Rate Doctrine's
Goals
As a defense in cases involving previously regulated markets, the filed rate
doctrine continues to serve an important purpose where three conditions are
present: (1) where nondiscrimination
remains an important regulatory goal;
(2) where regulators possess the authorAdministrative and Regulatory Law News

ity and in fact do evaluate costs and
prices; and (3) where regulators possess
an adequate remedy for nondiscrinination.While cost-of-service regulation
may have justified a presumption against
the exercise ofjudicial authority in most
cases, in a deregulated environment is
must be presumed that the agency has
not engaged in an extensive firm-specific
evaluation of nondiscrimination.
Before resorting to the filed rate
doctrine to decline considerations of the
merits of a dispute involving allegations
of market wrongs, a court first needs to
evaluate whether an agency accepting a
tariff possesses the authority to protect
against nondiscrimination and uses it
in ways that would present a conflict
with courts or make judicial enforcement unnecessary. In many contexts, as
in Texas, it is not at all clear that agency
regulators possess the authority to evaluate tariffs for nondiscrimination, or to
remedy discrinination and other market
abuses.
In other contexts, as in FERC's
market based tariffs, it is not at all clear
that regulators routinely evaluate and
exercise authority to protect against
nondiscrinination. Lockyer v. FERCheld
that the filed rate doctrine can apply to
FERC's market-based rates, but only if
FERC does something more than make
a cursory finding of no market power in
accepting a rate filing. 383 F3d 1006 (9th
Cir. 2004). If FERC does not actively
monitor market-based rates for market
abuses,"the purpose of the filed rate
doctrine is undernined" and "the tariff
runs afoul of.... the FPA." Id. at 1013.
Nondiscrimination may be a questionable regulatory goal in today's regulatory
environment, in which markets not
regulators are increasingly determining
prices. However, as regulators are increasingly moving to competitive market
approaches, nondiscrimination should
no longer give rise to a presumptive filed
rate defense.
In addition, federal courts have at their
disposal commonly-used doctrines that
better promote the other purposes of
the filed tariff doctrine, such as federal
preemption and deference.Absent a clear
regulatory policy of protecting against
nondiscrimination, along with active
regulatory program designed to do so,

there is no reason to give a filed tariff
an independent legal effect in order to
further these goals.
Courts, for example, sometime find
that national regulatory programs
preempt state law remedies for breach of
contract and tort. Such determinations
are not automatic, but courts carefully
evaluate the scope of the regulatory
scheme and the extent to which it
presents a conflict with state remedies.
By contrast, courts applying the filed
rate doctrine as in Town of Norwood often
use the mere existence of a filed tariff
to imply federal preemption, with little
or no analysis of whether a regulatory
conflict in fact exists.
In addition, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction - widely used in federal
judicial proceedings involving agency
regulation - makes it unnecessary for
courts to apply the filed tariff doctrine in
order to further the goal of agency deference in rejecting antitrust claims.[hile
the filed tariff doctrine bars both present
and future claims, primary jurisdiction
does not confer complete immunity to
the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
Instead, in applying the doctrine courts
temporarily stay any judicial enforcement pending agency regulation of
the conduct at issue. Primary jurisdiction provides a less blunt tool for courts
to respect agency deference in a dual
jurisdiction enforcement context involving both federal agencies and courts, as
frequently arises under the antitrust laws.
Finally, in antitrust cases such as the
antitrust complaints against power
suppliers in Texas' deregulated market,
a federal courts use of the filed rate
doctrine to bar claims is a completely
inappropriate - and astonishingly overbroad - defense to antitrust claims. In
such instances, state action immunity, an
alternative doctrine from antitrust law, is
a more effective way for a court to evaluate the appropriateness of deference to
the state regulator.This judicially-created
antitrust defense originated when the
Supreme Court rejected a Sherman
Act challenge to a California marketing
program brought by a grower because
the program derived "its authority and its
efficacy from the legislative command of
continued on page 17
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Will Congress Fund the Administrative
Conference of the United States?
By Warren Belmar*

She

the United States (ACUS) was
Administrative
Conference
established
by statute
in 1964 of
as a permanent body to identify the
causes of inefficiency, delay, and unfairness in administrative proceedings
affecting public rights, and to recommend improvements to the President,
the Departments and Agencies of the
Executive Branch, the Congress, and
the courts.' For almost 30 years, until
its then $1.8 million dollar annual
budget was eliminated in 1995,ACUS
achieved these purposes by bringing
together the talents of acknowledged
scholars of administrative law from
various backgrounds, supported by an
extremely competent career staff.The
largest group ofACUS members came
from the ranks of senior officials from
every Department and Agency of the
federal government, and representatives
from the federal and state judiciaries
and administrative law corps.The
next largest group ofACUS members
consisted of a diverse group of outstanding private (including "public interest")
practitioners and academics who served
without compensation for two-year
terms, and acted in a non-partisan
fashion.
ACUS was led by a Chairman
appointed by the President for a five year
term who was confirmed by the Senate.
* Advisory board member, former section
chair and former public member ofACUS;
Deputy General Counsel for Energy Policy,
U. S.Department of Energy.
' Administrative Conference Act of 1964
(P.L. 88-499).
2 These committees were: (1) Agency
Organization and Personnel, (2) Claims Adjudication, (3) Compliance and Enforcement
Proceedings, (4) Grant and benefit Programs,
(5) Informal Action, (6) Judicial Review, (7)
Licenses and Authorizations, (8) Ratemaking
and Economic Regulation, and (9) Rulemaking and Public Information.
3 See H. Rep. No. 103-127 (1993) (Treasury,
Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Bill, 1994) at p. 76.
4 H. Rep. No. 110-390 (2008).
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In addition to the Chairman,ACUS was
composed of a Council of 10 additional
individuals who were appointed by the
President for three year terms, no more
than one-half of whom could be federal
employees, and an Assembly composed
of the entire ACUS membership, which
by statute could have no more than 101
nor less than 75 members.The Assembly
acted as a legislative body, and initially
established nine standing conmmiittees
to develop recommendations for its
consideration. 2 Committee recommen-

dations would be reviewed by affected
agencies before final committee action,
and thereafter the committee-adopted
recommendations would be forwarded
to the Council and then to the Assembly for final action during a plenary
session. Recommendations adopted by
the Assembly were, by virtue of their
own merit, often voluntarily adopted by
various agencies, the Congress, and the
courts.The result was the fairer and more
efficient operation of the federal government, and the undisputed savings of tens
of millions of dollars in excess of the
funds appropriated forACUS' operations.
Notwithstanding the unanimous
acknowledgment of the extraordinary
value ofACUS' contributions during its
first 30 years, as reflected in reauthorizations by the 104th and 108th Congresses,
ACUS has been inactive since 1995
because Congress has chosen not to
appropriate the funds authorized for its
operations.This was due initially to the
conclusion of the House Committee
on Appropriations in 1994 that ACUS
had "fully accomplished its mission."3
This year, the 110' Congress once again
acknowledged that ACUS' mission has
not been fully accomplished when it
passed the Regulatory Improvement
Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-290), (signed by
President BushJuly 30,2008) which
authorizes an annual appropriation of
$3.2 million for fiscal years 2008,2009

and 2010 to reconstitute ACUS and
resurrect its operations.
The legislative history of the Regulatory Improvement Act of 2007, like the
legislative history of the Federal Regulatory Improvement Act of 2004 (PL.
108-401) before it, makes a compelling
case for the funding ofACUS.As spelled
out in detail in the October 17,2007
Report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary accompanying H.R. 3564, 4 the
need for an independent, nonpartisan
ACUS to analyze the administrative law
process and to develop recommendations
to address today's issues is undeniable,
and the small amount of authorized
funding will produce far greater societal
and financial benefits for the Nation than
the amount authorized for its operations.
In only 17 pages, the Report recounts
the many achievements ofACUS, lists
support for ACUS' reauthorization from
all segments of the political and judicial
sectors, as well as from private and public
interest practitioners and their numerous
organizations, and references past and
current Congressional Research Service
studies which identified areas that call
out for attention by ACUS.
The American Bar Association,
primarily through the efforts of members
of the Section ofAdministrative Law
and Regulatory Practice, has been in the
forefront of the 14 year effort to reauthorize and fund ACUS. Among those who
have helped are former Section leaders
such as Supreme CourtJustices Antonin
Scalia and Stephen Breyer, former
Section Chairs Phil HarterTom Susman,
C. Boyden Gray and Randy May, and
formerACUS leaders and Section
members Jeffrey Lubbers, Gary Edles,
Marshall Breger, and Robert Anthony.
It is now our turn to pitch in and help
secure funding for ACUS by recounting the innumerable accomplishments
it achieved and by identifying the ways
in which it can continue to make such
contributions in the future. C>
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Karen Weathersbee is the winner of the third
annual Gellhom-Sargentich Law Student
Essay Competition. Ms. Weathersbee was
a second-year student at the University of
Baltimore School of Law when she submitted
her entry. Her article examines the policy
considerationsand legal implications that
attend the use of quarantineas a defense
against the spread ofcommunicable disease.

Quarantine: Its Use and
Limitations
n May 2007, an Atlanta attorney
who was diagnosed with what was
originally believed to be a dangerous
form of tuberculosis was held in isolation at an Atlanta hospital. Under the
first federal isolation order in forty-four
years, he was sequestered under armed
guard and later transferred to a Colorado facility.' Nearly two months later,
a seventeen year old Mexican national
living in the Atlanta area was diagnosed
with tuberculosis.2 The teenager refused
medical treatment and, as a result, was
held in medical
isolation at Gwinnet County jail.3
Quarantine is a multifaceted issue that
must balance individual rights against
public safety. History reveals some
instances where quarantine has been
used as a weapon of prejudice and abuse.
In a world where a dangerous contagion
could potentially afflict millions in a very
short amount of time, the proper implementation of quarantine requires careful
consideration.
The use of quarantine as an extensive public health measure should be
curtailed for the following reasons: 1)
quarantine has been historically used to
discriminate against minorities; 2) studies
demonstrate that mass quarantine is ineffective; and 3) a large scale quarantine
would be difficult to implement.

History of Quarantine
The concept of quarantine is not
recent. Medical historians believe the
writings of Greek scholars Thucydides
and Hippocrates suggest that the ancient
Greeks "avoided the contagious."4 In
1374,Venice instituted a forty-day quarantine for ships entering the city' Due
to a fear of the plague, a ship's crew and
passengers were forced to remain in port
until the time period ended.6 In response
to the plague, similar measures were later
introduced throughout other parts of
7

Europe.

In the United States, one of the first
documented instances of quarantine
occurred in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony. Ships from the West Indies were
denied entry because of concerns they
carried the plague.8 Prior to 1796, quarantine legislation was the responsibility
of the states. Congress enacted a quarantine law in 1796 largely in response to
an outbreak of yellow fever.9 The 1796
law was repealed and replaced in 1799
with an Act Respecting Quarantine and
Health Laws.'The 1799 act authorized
federal officials to assist states in the
execution of their quarantine laws."
In the late 1800s, an outbreak of
yellow fever ravaged the United States.' 2
Cholera was also prevalent during this
time.' 3 As a result of these epidemics,
Congress passed an act in 1879 to
prevent the introduction of contagious
and infectious diseases in the United
' Howard Markel, Quarantine:East European
Jewish Immigrants and the NewYork City Epidemics of 1892,2 (1997).
1 Id. at 3.
6

Id.

7 Paul Sehdev, The Origin of Quarantine,35

(9) J. CLINICAL

& INFECTIOUs DISEASE,

1071,

1072.
8 Jennifer K. Elsea & Kathleen Swendiman,
Federal &State QuarantineAuthority, CRS

States. 14 This act authorized the Board of
Health to "erect temporary quarantine
buildings" or "acquire on behalf of the
United States titles to real estate for that
purpose."' 5

State Quarantine Power
In the 19' century, while quarantine
legislation was debated in Congress,
states and state rights advocates argued
that quarantine enforcement should be
handled by states instead of the federal
government. 6 In the case of Morgan's
La. &T.R. & S.S. v. Board of Health
of La., the shipping company argued
that an assessment of a fee for quarantine inspection was "a regulation of
commerce exclusively within the powers
of Congress."'7
In response to the shipping company's
argument, the Supreme Court reiterated that the quarantine law of 1799
"clearly recognizes the quarantine laws
of the states" and further stated that the
state laws were "valid until displaced
or contravened by some legislation of
Congress.""
Quarantine laws continued to be
within the purview of the states for
much of the early 1800s.With the
continuing epidemics of yellow fever
and cholera, a shift to federal control
of quarantine enforcement began in
1866." 9 In 1870, Congress passed a
resolution authorizing a visit to major
port cities within the U.S. by an Army
Medical Officer.2" After the visit, the
Army Medical Officer presented a
report to Congress on his findings and
recommended means for controlling the
yellow fever epidemic. 2' Dr.Brown, the
appointed officer at the time, believed
"unity of control was necessary" to
effectively control the outbreak of yellow
"

Id. at 630.

I Meredith Hobbs, Speaker Beats TB, Now
Wants Standing Back, 118 FULTON Co. DAILY

REPORT (Jan. 23,2007).

15 Id.

9 Edwin Maxey, Federal QuarantineLaws, 23

I6

REPORT 176, Sept. 10, 2007.

Id. at 622.

(4) POL. Sci. Q. 618 (Dec. 1908).

17 118 U.S. 455,461 (1886).

Craig Schneider, Teen JailedinAnother Case
ofTB, Atlanta Constitution,Aug. 26, 2007 at
D1

at
"o Id.
11 Id.

'9

12

Id. at 625.

20

3
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Id.
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2

Id.
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Id. at 464.
Maxey, Supra Note 9, at 623.
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fever. 22 He also recommended that "a
national system of quarantine be substi23
tuted for the various local systems.

CDC Quarantine Regulations
The Centers for Disease Control
("CDC") is authorized pursuant to the
Public Health Service Act to promulgate
regulations deemed necessary to control
"transmission or spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the
United States and from one State or
possession into another."2 Regulations
implementing federal quarantine authority were last substantively amended in
1985.25 More recently, in November
2005, the CDC issued a proposed rule
on quarantine. 26 The proposed regulations authorize CDC officials, and other
authorized officials, to screen "at airports
and other locations" for persons who
may be infected with communicable
diseases. 27 The proposed regulation also
recognizes in instances where a passenger withholds consent, he or she may be
detained for disease screening.2" A person
or group of persons deemed to be in the
initial stages of a communicable disease
may be detained under provisional
29

quarantine.

The proposed regulations outline three
methods in which provisional quarantine may be initiated by the "quarantine
officer" or "other authorized agents of
the Director. ' 3' First, the person or group
of persons believed to be infected may
be issued a "written provisional quarantine order."31 Second, an "authorized
party" may issue a verbal provisional
quarantine order to a person or group
of persons believed to be infected with a
communicable disease.3 2 Finally, a person
or group of persons may be placed
under "actual movement restrictions."
The proposed regulations define "actual
22
23

Id.
Id.

2442 U.S.C. 361.
25 42 C.ER.

§ 70.

Control of Communicable Diseases,
Proposed Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (Nov. 30,
2005).
27 Id. at 71,902.
28 Id. at 71,902-03.
26

29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32

Id.
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movement restrictions" as when a person
would understand that he or she is being
33
detained and thus is not free to leave.
The proposed regulations prescribe
that provisional quarantine shall last "only
as long as necessary for the quarantine
officer (or other authorized agent) to
ascertain whether the person or groups
of persons are a possible carrier of
disease."34 Provisional quarantine is only
active a maximum of three days. 35 For

quarantine periods in excess of three
days, the Director will issue "a quarantine
order. '3 6 Person(s) placed in provisional

quarantine will be offered medical
treatment.While medical treatment is
voluntary, those who refuse must remain
in quarantine.

37

The proposed regulations describe
the process of issuing a provisional quarantine order and also generally describe
what information this order would
contain.The provisional quarantine order
will usually be issued by the Director
when a person or group of persons is
placed in provisional quarantine.3 1 While
the proposed regulations specify that
service of a provisional quarantine order
"will typically occur through personal
service," in certain circumstances "public
posting" may suffice.39 The regulations
further provide that the provisional quarantine order must inform the person or
group of persons of the following: 1) the
suspected disease; 2) that the person may
be contagious or carry a disease with
the potential of causing a public health
emergency if spread; 3) that there is a
"reasonable belief" the person or group
will travel out of state; and 4) that the
provisional quarantine is for a maximum
of three days at which time the
individual(s) may be released or "served
with a quarantine order."4 Individual(s)
served with a quarantine order may
request an administrative hearing. In
additionjudicial review may be sought
by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 1
33 Id.

I Id. at 71,903.
35 Id.

36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.

Equal Protection Considerations
of Quarantine
Quarantine in the United States has
been used in some cases to discriminate
against certain minority groups. Physician and medical historian Howard
Markel writes of an extensive quarantine
of Russian Jewish immigrants in response
to an outbreak of typhoid in NewYork
City. In 1892, four cases of typhoid fever
were discovered in a tenement house
among passengers who recently arrived
on the ship Massila.4 2 As a result, the New
York City health officials, charged with
enforcing quarantine regulations, ordered
the quarantine of"every single Russian
Jewish passenger of the Massila." 3 New
York City health officials quarantined
1,200 people, mostly Russian Jews, at
North Brother Island.Approximately
1,100 of those quarantined were healthy
people who happened to live near
former Massila passengers.44 Officials
sought to link the illness with other
45
Eastern European Jewish immigrants.
The 1892 quarantine would later be
used by some members of Congress as
a platform to exclude Eastern European
Jewish immigrants from the United
States.46

Similarly, the City of San Francisco
enacted a quarantine regulation in 1900
that discriminated against Chinese
residents.The regulation required all
Chinese residents of San Francisco to be
administered a bubonic plague vaccine.4 7
The law additionally restricted Chinese
residents of San Francisco from traveling
outside of the city without the requisite
documentation demonstrating they had
been vaccinated against the bubonic
plague.4 8 Even though 350,000 people
lived in San Francisco at the time, the
resolution applied only to the city's
49
Chinese inhabitants.

The San Francisco regulation was challenged in two cases,Jew Ho v.Williamson
42

Markel, Supra note 4 at 46.

41Id. at 50.
4 Id. at 59.
45 Id.
46 Id. at

75

" Wong Wai v.Williamson, 103 F 1,3 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1900).
48 Id.
49 Id. at
6.
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and Wong Wai v. Williamson.5 The plaintiffs
alleged that the regulation violated the
equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.The court noted "they [the
regulations] are directed against the Asiatic
race exclusively, and by name." "They
[Chinese residents] are denied the privilege
of traveling from one place to another,
except upon conditions not enforced
against any other class of people."1 For these
reasons, the court found that the regulation
violated their rights under equal5 2protection
clause of the 14th Amendment.
History has clearly shown how quarantines can be extremely abusive. In order to
safeguard the rights of vulnerable groups
and individuals, quarantines must be
cautiously implemented and used only
when absolutely necessary.

Due Process Implications

of Quarantine

Because of the restrictions imposed
during quarantine, due process considerations are particularly important.The
Supreme Court has found that "due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands ' 53 In Mathews, the Supreme Court
developed a three-factor test for assessing
the adequacy of a proceeding under the
Due Process Clause: 1) the privacy interest
that will be affected by the official action; 2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the Government's
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedures would entail.54
When there are potential threats to the
public health, courts have generally given
broad discretion to public health officials
for quarantine enforcement. In the case
of Barmore v. Robertson, a Chicago woman
sought a writ of habeus corpus claiming
that she was unlawfully quarantined at her
home. 55 Although she had never been ill
with typhoid fever, local health authorities believed that she carried the illness.56
Supra note 46;JewHo v.Williamson, 103 E
10 (C.C.D. Cal. 1900).
5' Supra note 46 at 9.
"0

52

Id.

5' Mathews v.Eldridge,424 U.S. 319,321
(1976).
54

Id.

55 302 Ill. 422 (ll. 1922).
56 Id. at 424.
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The quarantine imposed by local health
officials required her to remain at home.
While under quarantine, she was to receive57
no visitors who had not been immunized.
The Supreme Court of Illinois deemed the
imposition of quarantine of a seemingly
healthy person necessaryThe Court further
found, "it is not necessary that one be actually sick, as the term is usually applied, in
order that the health authorities have the
right to restrain
his liberties by quarantine
5
regulations. '
The loss of individual rights during
quarantine should be considered relative to
the loss of rights in comparable situations.
Interestingly, the protection of these rights
of quarantined individuals is in some cases
less than the protection offered to prisoners. Biomedical research involving prisoners
requires additional informed consent and
ethical review procedures to ensure that
they are not coerced into participating in
the research. 9 Additionally, for biomedical
research involving prisoners, the Department of Health and Human Services
requires the appointment of an internal
review board to determine whether the
level of risk involved for prisoner volunteers is comparable to that of"nonprisoner
volunteers.' 6 Thus, extra procedures are in
place to ensure that prisoner volunteers are
not coerced into participating in biomedical
research. In contrast, if an individual is placed
in quarantine and then consents to medical
treatment that is required to leave quarantine, a question exists as to whether this
consent was truly voluntary.The idea that an
individual under quarantine has fewer rights
than an individual in prison clearly points
to an inherent problem with the proposed
quarantine regulations.

Implementation and
Effectiveness Concerns
of Quarantine
Another reason why extensive quarantine measures should be restricted is that
quarantines are effective only in limited
circumstances." Richard Schabas points
out three highly improbable factors that
must be present in order for a quarantine
31 Id. at 425.
51 Id. at 433.
' 45 C.EK. § 302.
SId. at § 305.
61 SeeJoseph Barbara, M.D., et al, Large-Scale
QuarantineFollowing Biological Terrorisn in
the United States, 286 (21) J.A.M.A. (Dec. 5,
2001).

continuedfrom page 15
to work. 1)Patients must show signs of
having a communicable disease that can be
transmitted in its early stages.With many
diseases, this simply is not possible. 2) Effective quarantine requires the identification
of"all, or virtually all, people incubating
the infection." 3) Compliance is necessary
62
in order for quarantine to be effective.
During the SARS outbreak in the early
2000's, many people refused to comply with
the quarantine implemented by the Canadian government.63 Schabas further suggests
that entry screening of airport passengers is
unlikely to be effective against the importation of certain pandemic diseases
due to
64
their long incubation periods.
In addition to the limited effectiveness of
quarantine enforcement, the practical issues
of quarantine must be taken into consideration. Quarantine enforcement would
place a heavy burden on an overtaxed travel
industry.65 Large passenger jets can hold as
many as five hundred passengers, making it
economically and logistically nearly impossible to implement a reliable quarantine. As
a reference, when an Iowa college student
contracted measles while on a trip to India,
he was sequestered for nearly two months
upon his return. 66 A study estimated the
cost of his isolation at $142,252.67 These
concerns demonstrate that a further examination of the practicality and effectiveness of
quarantine is needed before issuance of final
quarantine regulations.

Conclusion
Initially, quarantine may seem like a
necessary tool to protect the public health
in the event of pandemic illness. However,
closer examination demonstrates that the
use of quarantine can be full of potential
missteps: discrimination, abuse of individual rights, and misapplication of valuable
resources on an essentially ineffective
measure.The CDC's proposed regulations
must be further developed not only to avoid
these potential missteps, but also to effectively implement a quarantine. C)
62

Richard Schabas, Is theQuarantineAct Rele-

vant?, 176 (13) CAN. MED.Ass'N.J. 1840,1841

June 19, 2007).
Id.
64 Id.
65 Supra note 61 at 1841.
66 Gustavo H. Dayan, M.D., The Cost of
Containing One Case of Measles:TDe Economic
Inipact on the Public Health Infrastncture-Iowa
2004,116 (1) PEwiTxics el.
63

67

Id.
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European Union Administrative Law
concerning acquisition, maintenance, and
dissemination of personal data by their
institutions and by private parties.The
public has the right to see data and rectify
erroneous information and the "controllers" of data must obtain the consent of
individuals before processing data, unless
the data fit within one of the exceptions,
which are wide-ranging.Judicial review,
with the right to damages, is available.
The interface between the rules on
access to documents and on privacy is
potentially problematic.Where the access
law requires disclosure, the privacy regulation law permits disclosure. But the former
prohibits disclosure where it would undermine privacy protections. Unfortunately,
there are different interpretations among
responsible officials as to the scope of
personal privacy protections under the law.

Oversight
Oversight in the EU is complex
compared to the U.S. because political
authority is more diffuse.While no single
entity or entities exercise ultimate "control"
or "review," the reporters conclude that

continuedfrom page 5

the administrative activities of the EU are
reasonably "under control."
Executive oversight of administrative
activity of the Commission and the administrative agencies is exercised principally
by the Council of Ministers and, on more
purely political matters, by the European
Council.They also exercise their authority
through COREPER and the comitology
committees.
Legislative oversight of administrative
activity occurs at both the EU and national
levels.The European Parliament is a part of
the decision-making process and oversees
the Commission and the administrative
agencies. National legislative assemblies are
increasingly overseeing EU administrative
processes, with an emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity.
Another category of oversight is
provided by bodies that are part of the
EU governance architecture but operate
with political independence.The reporters
describe a number of these bodies, such as
the European Data Protection Supervisor (who oversees implementation of data
privacy guarantees at the EU level).As the

reporters note," [t]hese independent bodies
serve the interests of oversight by uncovering information about the substance
of regulatory policies, their costs, or how
programs are being administered, which
then becomes available to other bodies
engaged in more direct forms of oversight."
Finally, external oversight is exercised by
staff unions, lobbyists, nongovernmental
organizations, academia, and the press.
There remains the question of the counterpart to the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget. Increasingly, it appears that this
role will be centralized within the Secretariat General.

Conclusion
It is difficult to do justice to the institutional and procedural richness of the
EU's administrative processes, especially
when the analysis is conducted through
accepted categories of U.S. administrative law. Nevertheless, the Section and the
reporters hope that their work provides
guidance and understanding for those who
work with the EU, as well as for those who
are engaged in regulatory cooperation and
convergence efforts. C.)

Why the Filed Rate Doctrine Should Not Imply Blanket Judicial Deference
to Regulatory Agencies continuedfrom page 12
the state." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
350 (1943).As modern courts apply the
doctrine, "First, the challenged restraint
must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as the state policy';
second, the policy must be 'actively
supervised' by the state itself." California

Retail Liquor DealersAss'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 455 U.S. 97,105 (1980)
(citation omitted).
The Texas federal district court which
dismissed antitrust complaints failed to
make any effort to determine whether
the supplier's alleged misdeeds are
immune given state regulatory action
under the federal antitrust laws. Indeed,
since Texas affirmatively adopted a
competitive market model but did not
give TPUC plenary enforcement authority over suppliers, a claim of state action
immunity in this case is unlikely to
succeed.
Each of these alternative legal
doctrines provides a much more precise
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and effective means of promoting the
goals of federal preemption and agency
deference than the filed rate doctrine. In
contrast to the filed rate doctrine these
approaches are not dependent on firmspecific actions, but focus on the agency
regulator's authority and actions as well
as the statutory scheme implemented. In
this sense, they provide a more complete
picture of the public interest in ensuring some enforcement of legal standards
against market abuses in energy markets
than overbroad resort to the filed rate
doctrine.

Conclusion
A more tempered approach to the filed
rate doctrine is consistent with the Otter
Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 376,
377 (1973), which refused to apply the
filed tariff antitrust claims by competitors because the court perceived only "a
potential conflict" with FERC's authority over transmission. More recently, in

Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, the Court
held that courts clearly have the authority to apply general antitrust principles

to regulated firms. 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004)
(considering an essential facilities claim,
refusal to deal, and monopoly leveraging,
but rejecting these claims on the merits).
Courts would best serve the development of competitive markets in electric
power, natural gas and telecommunications if they were to look to alternative
legal doctrines to serve the purposes
of the filed rate doctrine, rather than
embracing blanket deference principles.
Rate and tariff filings in the partially
deregulated contexts that predominate
in these industries today should be of
no less legal and policy consequence
than other regulatory instruments which
receive judicial deference. But they also
should not be of any more legal and
policy consequence. C>
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The Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
Section welcomes you to the 2008 Administrative
Law Conference at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in
Washington D.C from October 16 - 18. Join more
than 700 of your colleagues for an update on critical

issues in a convenient, timely and affordable session
geared to your needs. Visit the Section's website
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ for more
information and to register for the conference.
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By Robin Kundis Craig*
The Chenery Doctrine and Judicial Review
of Administrative Action
Toward the end of its 2007-2008 term, the Supreme Court
examined the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERC's) justifications for a rate decision in Morgan Stanley
CapitalGroup,Inc. v.Public Utility DistrictNo. Iof Snohomish
County,- U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2733 (June 26,2008). Under the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. % 824 et seq., FERC regulates the
sale of electricity in interstate commerce, including overseeing
rate schedules, or "tariffs."The Act requires that all wholesale
electricity rates be "just and reasonable."
In Morgan Stanley, in a 5-2 decision authored by Justice Scalia
(ChiefJustice Roberts and Justice Breyer took no part in the
decision;Justices Stevens and Souter dissented), the Court
acknowledged that" [t] he statutory requirement that rates be
'justand reasonable' is obviously incapable of precise judicial
definition, and we afford great deference to the Commission in
its rate decisions." Morgan Stanley, 128 S.Ct. at 2738. However,
in two cases in 1956, the Court also acknowledged that utilities should not be able to freely abrogate rates set in bilateral
contracts by filing unilaterally a new tariff with FERC.Thus,
when bilateral rate contracts exist, FERC is generally bound by
this Mobile-Sierra presumption in favor of the contract rates - a
presumption that the contract rate is itself"just and reasonable"
and not in need of amendment - when the agency reviews
tariff notifications.
Morgan Stanley, however, involved long-term contracts that
western utilities entered into in 2000 and 2001, when electricity rates were "very high by historical standards," especially in
California. Id. at 2743.When that energy crisis passed, however,
the utilities wished to purchase power at much cheaper rates
and asked FERC to approve new tariffs.The utilities argued
first that the Mobile-Sierrapresumption should not apply
because FERC had never initially approved the contract
without the presumption.They also argued that, even under
Mobile-Sierra,the contract rates were so high that they violated
the public interest, rendering that contracts unjust and
unreasonable.
"After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the Mobile-Sierra
should apply to the contracts and that the contracts did not
seriously harm the public interest." Id. FERC affirmed, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
FERC's order "agreed with the Ninth Circuit's premise that
the Commission must have an initial opportunity to review a
contract without the Mobile-Sierrapresumption, but maintained
that" FERC had had that equivalent of that first review. Id. at
2745. Before the Supreme Court, however, FERC attempted
* Attorneys'Title Insurance Fund Professor of Law, Florida State
University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida.
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to change the rationale for its decision, "arguing that there is
no such prerequisite - or at least that FERC could reasonably
conclude so and therefore that Chevron deference is in order."
Id. (citations omitted).The Court, however, disagreed, invoking the doctrine from SEC v.Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,94-95
(1943):"We will not uphold a discretionary agency decision
where the agency has offered ajustification in court different
from what it provided in its opinion." Id.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not invalidate FERC's
decision or remand on the basis of the Chenery doctrine.
Instead, having concluded that FERC was required to apply
the Mobile-Sierra presumption, it upheld FERC's decision.The
fact that FERC "provided a different rationale for the necessary result is no cause for upsetting its ruling.'To remand would
be an idle and useless formality. Chenery does not require that
we convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong
game.." Id. (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
766-67 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion)).
In dissent,Justice Stevens,joined by Justice Souter, concentrated on the validity and import of the Mobile-Sierradoctrine
itself, concluding that the presumption distorted the statutory
"just and reasonable" standard. However, they also criticized the
majority for mis-applying the Chenery doctrine.They emphasized that reviewing courts cannot accept an agency's post
hoc rationalizations. Id. at 2758 (J.Stevens, dissenting). Moreover, "even assuming FERC subjectively believed that it was
applying the just-and-reasonable standard despite its repeated
declarations to the contrary," the orders would then be too
ambiguous to uphold.
The net effect of the majority's decision, according to the
dissenters, was to inappropriately cabin FERC's discretion in
rate review.By concluding that FERC was required to apply
the Mobile-Sierrapresumption,"[t]he Court has curtailed the
agency's authority to interpret the terms 'just and reasonable' and thereby substantially narrowed FERC's discretion to
protect the public interest by the means it thinks best. Contrary
to congressional intent, FERC no longer has the flexibility to
adjust its review of contractual rates to account for changing
conditions in the energy markets or among consumers." Id. at
2759 (J.Stevens, dissenting).

Separation of Powers
Prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were again the
subject of Supreme Court expositions on the constitutional
role ofjudicial review in Boumediene v.Bush,- U.S.-, 128 S.
Ct. 2229 (June 12,2008). In this 5-4 decision,Justice Kennedy
authored the majority opinion,joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. ChiefJustice Roberts authored
the dissenting opinion for himself andJustices Scalia,Thomas,
and Alito.
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More specifically, the case involved Congress's authority to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. In the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA), 119 Stat. 2739, Congress amended 28
U.S.C. § 2241 to provide that "no court,justice, orjudge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." The
Act also vested the D.C. Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Combat Status ReviewTribunals
(CSRTs), which the Department of Defense established to
determine detainees' status as "enemy combatants."
After the Supreme Court determined that the Act did
not apply to pending habeas proceedings, Congress enacted
the Military Conmnissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e), §7, which purports to strip the federal courts of
jurisdiction over pending as well as future habeas petitions by
or on behalf of alien Guantanamo detainees determined to
be enemy combatants or awaiting such determination.The
Supreme Court in Boumediene determined that the procedures
for reviewing detainees' status in the DTA "are not an adequate
and effective substitute for habeas corpus" and hence that §7
of the MCA"operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2240.
The Court's opinion in Boumediene is long and incorporated
both a historical review of the role of habeas corpus and technical interpretations of both the statutes and the Constitution.
Of perhaps most interest to administrative law practitioners,
however, is the role that separation-of-powers principles played
in the decision.
First, the Court figured the writ of habeas corpus as an essential component in the constitutional protection of individual
liberty, a part of the Constitution's overall separation-of-powers
scheme. "The Framers' inherent distrust of governmental
power was the driving force behind that constitutional plan
that allocated powers among three independent branches:'
and "the Framers considered the writ a vital instrument for
the protection of individual liberty ... ." Id. at 2246.As a result,
they allowed Congress only limited grounds for suspending the
writ, and hence the Suspension Clause "ensures that, except
during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have the
time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the 'delicate balance
of governance' that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty." Id. at
2247 (citations omitted).
Second, the Court rejected the Government's formal interpretation of the extraterritorial application of the Constitution
and hence the availability of the writ, in part on separation of
powers grounds. Noting that "[t]he United States has maintained complete and uninterrupted control of the bay for over
100 years" the Court rejected the idea "that the Constitution
had no effect there, at least to noncitizens, because the United
States disclaimed sovereignty in the formal sense of the term."
Id. at 2258. In effect, the Government's argument proved too
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much:"The necessary implication of the argument is that by
surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at the same time entering into a lease
that grants total control over the territory back to the United
States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern
without legal constraint." Id. at 2258-59. Such decisions were
not for the Executive Branch and Congress to make:
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.The
Constitution grants Congress and the President the power
to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power
to decide when and where its terms apply. Even when the
United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not
"absolute and unlimited" but are subject "to such restrictions
as are expressed in the Constitution." Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15,44 ...(1885).Abstaining from questions involving
formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing.
To hold the political branches have the power to switch the
Constitution on or off at will is quite another.The former
position reflects this Court's recognition that certain matters
requiring political judgmlents are best left to the political
branches.The latter would permit a striking anomaly in our
tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which
Congress and the President, not this Court, say "what the law
is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,177 ...(1803).
Id. at 2259. Moreover,"[t]hese concerns have particular bearing
upon the Suspension Clause question in the cases now before
us, for the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.The test for
determining the scope of this provision must not be subject to
manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain:'
Id. In particular,"[w]here a person is detained by executive
order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a court,
the need for collateral review is most pressing.' Id. at 2269.
The majority, therefore, clearly asserted the courts' duty to
oversee and constrain the other two branches of the federal
government.The dissenters, in contrast, viewed the Court as
over-enthusiastically striking down "the most generous set of
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this
country as enemy combatants" "without bothering to say
what due process rights the detainees possess, without explaining how the statute fails to vindicate those rights, and before a
single petitioner has even attempted to avail himself of the law's
operation.' Id. at 2279 (C.J. Roberts, dissenting).The dissenters
would have been far more deferential to the political branches
"amidst an ongoing military conflict," and perceived a different
kind of separation of powers problem:"One cannot help but
think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority's ambitious opinion, that this decision is not really about the
detainees at all, but about control of federal policy regarding
enemy combatants." Id.
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Constitutional Interpretation
In its perhaps most controversial decision of the term, on
June 26,2008, the Supreme Court decided, 5-4, in an opinion
by Justice Scalia Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
dissented) that the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms and
hence that statutes banning handgun possession are unconstitutional. District of Columbia v.Heller,- U.S.-, 128 S. Ct.
2783,2816,2821-22 (une 26, 2008).While the substance
of the Second Amendment is generally outside the scope of
administrative law practice, the Court's statements regarding the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution are nevertheless worth
noting.
First, the Court emphasized that:
In interpreting this test, we are guided by the principle that
"[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning." United
States v.Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,731 ... (1931); see also Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 ... (1824). Normal meaning may of
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret
or technical meanings that would not have been known to
ordinary citizens in the founding generation.
Id. at 2788.Thus, the majority incorporated both a strict plain
meaning and an originalist approach to its interpretation of the
Second Amendment - the latter evidenced in its exhaustive
historical review of the Second Amendment.
Second, the majority divided the Second Amendment into a
prefatory clause ("A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State") and an operative clause ("the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed").
It then determined that, while the prefatory clause may "resolve
an ambiguity in the operative clause'"'a prefatory clause does
not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause." Id. at
2789.As such, according to the majority, the phrasing of the
Second Amendment could have equivalently been: "Because
a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not
be infringed." Id.As such, it focused its textual analysis on the
operative clause, returning to the prefatory clause only "to
ensure that our reading of the operative clause is consistent with
the announced purpose." Id. at 2789-90 (emphasis added).As
such, the amendment's purpose did not limit the scope of the
right but rather provided one reason for ensuring it.
In contrast, in his dissent,Justice Stevens argued that the
purpose of the Second Amendment -"to protect the right of
the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia" id. at 2822 0. Stevens, dissenting) - also defined
the scope of the right. "Neither the text of the Amendment nor
the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature's authority to regulate

private civilian uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine
the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution." Id.
On an interpretive level,Justice Breyer agreed "that the
Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defenserelated, interests." Id. at 2847 0. Breyer, dissenting). In addition,
he argued that governments still maintained the authority to
regulate rights protected in the Constitution, so long as the
regulations were reasonable. Id.

Statutory Construction
In Burgess v.United States,- U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 1572 (April
16,2008), a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Ginsburg, construed the meaning of"felony drug
offense" in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)
(1)(A), for purposes of determining whether a criminal defendant's sentence should be doubled. Specifically, the Court
addressed the interpretive issue of whether the Act's definition of"felony" in Section 802(13) - an "offense classified by
applicable Federal or State law as a felony" - limited the Act's
definition of"felony drug offense" in Section 802(44), which
otherwise defines such offenses as certain drug crimes that are
"punishable by imprisonment for more than one year[.] "The
relationship between the two definitions mattered because
Burgess's prior drug conviction was punishable by more than
a year of imprisonment but nevertheless was classified by the
state as a misdemeanor; thus, if the state classification controlled,
Burgess's new sentence could not be doubled.
The Court held that "felony drug offense" "is defined
exclusively by § 802(44) and does not incorporate § 802(13)'s
definition of'felony'A state drug offense punishable by more
than one year therefore qualifies as a 'felony drug offense: even
if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor." Burgess,
128 S.Ct. at 1575.
To reach this conclusion, the Court emphasized that"
[s]tatutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words
... in the usual case." Id. at 1577 (quoting Lawson v.Suwanee
Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198,201 (1949)). Moreover," [t]he
language and structure of the statute ... indicate that Congress
used the phrase 'felony drug offense' as a term of art defined
by § 802(44) without reference to § 802(13)." Id. First, that
definition used the word "means," effectively excluding any
other definition of"felony drug offense." Id. Second, felonies
are commonly defined as crimes punishable by more than
one year in prison. Id. at 1577-78. "Third, if Congress wanted
'felony drug offense' to incorporate the definition of felony in
§ 802(13), it easily could have written § 802(44) to state:'The
term "felony drug offense" means afelony that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year... "' Id. at 1578. Fourth,
the Court's reading"avoids anomalies" that the defendant's
reading would create. For example, "felony" refers only to state
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and federal crimes, while "felony drug offenses" include foreign
crimes. Id. In addition, not all states designate crimes as felonies
or misdemeanors. Id. at 1578-79."Finally, reading 5 802(44) as
the exclusive definition of'felony drug offense' hardly renders
5 802(13) extraneous." Id. at 1579.
From the Act's language and structure, the Court turned to
the drafting history of the Act to confirm its interpretation. In
particular, the Court emphasized that in 1994, Congress had
deliberately amended the definition of"felony drug offense"
to eliminate that definition's dependence on the definition of
"felony" specifically to remove differences in state classifications
in crimes as a consideration in federal sentencing. Id.Thus,"[b]y
recognizing 5 802(44) as the exclusive definition of'felony drug
offense.' Our reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994
revision: to bring a measure of uniformity to the application
of§ 841 (b)(1)(A) by eliminating disparities based on divergent
state classifications of offenses." Id. at 1579-80.
Finally, the Court refused to apply the rule of lenity.Asserting that this rule applies only when a statute is ambiguous,
the Court concluded that the Controlled Substances Act's
enhanced sentencing provision, in the context of the definition
of"felony drug offense," was not ambiguous. Id. at 1580.
In contrast, in United States v Santos, - U.S.-,128 S.Ct.
2020 (June 2, 2008), the Court divided in its approach to
interpreting undefined statutory terms. In this case, the issue was
whether "proceeds" in the federal money-laundering statute,
18 U.S.C. 5 1956(a)(1), means "receipts" or "profits."While an
unusual alignment five Justices -Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg,Thomas, and Stevens - agreed that the defendant was
entitled to post-conviction reliefJustice Stevens wrote separately to concur only in the judgnent, and Justices Breyer and
Alito filed separate dissents, with ChiefJustice RobertsJustice
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer joining Justice Alito.
Justice Scalia's plurality concluded that because "[t]he federal
money-laundering statute does not define 'proceeds," "we
give it its ordinary meaning." Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2024.After
consulting the Oxford English Dictionary,Random House Dictionary of the English Language,and Webster's New International
Dictionary,however, the plurality concluded that"' [p]roceeds'
can mean either 'receipts' or 'profits.' Both meanings are
accepted, and have long been accepted, in ordinary usage." Id.
Moreover, "proceeds""has not acquired a common meaning in
the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code." Id.
However,"[s]ince context gives meaning, we cannot say
the money-laundering statute is truly ambiguous until we
consider 'proceeds' not in isolation but as it is used in the federal
money-laundering statute." Id. Nevertheless, an examination
of context "leaves the ambiguity intact.' Id. Moreover,"[u]nder
either of the word's ordinary definitions, all provisions of the
federal money-laundering statute are coherent; no provisions
are redundant; and the statute is not rendered utterly absurd."

Id. at 2025.As a result, the rule of lenity applied, entitling the
defendant to relief. Id. However, the rule of lenity also carried
interpretive force with it:"Because the 'profits' definition of
'proceeds' is always more defendant-friendly than the 'receipts'
definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted."
Id. at 2025.
In his concurrenceJustice Stevens emphasized that"[w]hen
Congress fails to define potentially ambiguous statutory terms,
it effectively delegates to federal judges the task of filling gaps
in a statute." Id. at 2031 (J.Stevens, concurring). However, he
also recognized "that the same word can have different meanings in the same statute" and hence disagreed with Justice
Aito that the Court was bound to pick one meaning for
"proceeds." Id. at 2032 (J.Stevens, concurring). In addition,
Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Alito's conclusion that the
statute's legislative history required "proceeds" to be defined as
"gross receipts." Id.As a result,"the rule of lenity may weigh in
the determination' and he concurred in the judgment. Id. at
2033-34 J. Stevens, concurring).
Justice Breyer dissented. LikeJustice Scalia's plurality, "I
doubt that Congress intended the money laundering statute
automatically to cover financial transactions that constitute an
essential part of a different underlying crime." Id. at 2034
(J.Breyer, dissenting). However, he concluded thatJustice
Scalia's construction of "proceeds" would create "serious
logical and practical difficulties" and instead would resolve the
problem not through the definition of "proceeds" but through
a larger understanding of what the money-laundering statute
was trying to accomplish and its relationship to other crimes. Id.
at 2034-35 (J.Breyer, dissenting).
Finally,Justice Alito, in his dissent, criticized Justice Scalia's
plurality because "it makes no serious effort to interpret this
important statutory term."
Ignoring the context in which the term is used, the problems
that the money-laundering statute was enacted to address,
and the obvious practical considerations that those responsible for drafting the statute almost certainly had in mind, that
opinion is quick to pronounce the term hopelessly ambiguous and thus to invoke the rule of lenity. Concluding that
"proceeds" means "profits" the plurality opinion's interpretation would frustrate Congress' intent and maim a statute that
was enacted as an important defense against organized criminal enterprises.
Id. at 2035 (J.Alito, dissenting). Focusing on the purposes of
the money-laundering statute and the treatment of "proceeds"
under state and international law, Justice Alito concluded "that
the term 'proceeds' in the money laundering statute means
gross receipts, not net income.And contrary to the approach
taken byJustice Stevens, I do not see how the meaning of the
term 'proceeds' can vary depending on the nature of the illegal
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By William S.Jordan III*
D.C. Circuit - Clean Air Act's State-by-State Text

Trumps EPA's Regional Solution

EPA'S attempt to craft a regional solution to an undoubtedly
regional air pollution problem conflicted, according to the D.C.
Circuit, with a Clean Air Act provision designed to protect
air quality within particular states. In North Carolina v. EPA,
531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir 2008), the court insisted on strict
compliance with the statutory scheme even as it deferred to
EPA'sjudgnient in determining the pollution levels that would
constitute a violation of existing standards. 1
The Clean Air Act is an exercise in cooperative federalism.
Although EPA sets the maximum levels for certain pollutants
in the air (so-called "ambient standards"), the Act provides that
these standards will be enforced through State Implementation Plans (SIPs) developed by each of the states. In essence,
each state is to regulate its own factories and other sources of
pollution in order to assure that its own air meets the ambient
standards set by EPA.This scheme might well work if air pollution respected state boundaries. Each state could control its own
pollution sources and thereby control the quality of its own air.
But pollution knows no boundaries, as shown quite
dramatically by the effects of acid rain caused by Midwestern
coal-fired power plants on the lakes and forests of the Northeast. Responding to this problem in Title IV of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Congress authorized the acid rain
program, under which each source of sulfur dioxide (SO2)
and nitrous oxides (NOx) received pollution "allowances"
essentially at its existing level of pollution. Congress authorized pollution sources to buy and sell the allowances in order
to take advantage of market efficiencies.A source that could
reduce its emissions relatively cheaply could sell allowances to
another source for which reductions were more expensive.The
total number of allowances was capped at a certain level and
even designed to decline over time. Under a widely accepted
theory, this "cap-and-trade" system would enhance productivity and reduce emissions as efficiently as possible.The key to the
scheme is the ability to take advantage of a nationwide market
for these allowances.
Unfortunately, the acid rain program, apparently successful in
various ways, has not assured that the air in the downwind states
complies with the ambient standards. In order to meet the standard for ozone, for example, it is necessary to control SO, and
NOx, so-called precursors to ozone pollution. UnderTitle I of
the Clean Air Act, which requires compliance with the ambient
* C. Blake McDowell Professor of LawThe University ofAkron
School of Law; Council Member; ChairJudicial Review Conmittee;
and Contributing Editor.

standards, EPA issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR),
which sought to implement a modified cap-and-trade program
involving states contributing to the particular air pollution
problems and states affected by the pollution. EPA sought to
emulate the regional air pollution allowances market of the acid
rain program.
However sensible the policy, EPA's effort foundered on the
language ofTitle I.Addressing interstate air pollution, Section
110 provides that each state's SIP must prohibit emissions
"within the State" that will"contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other
State.'Although a cap-and-trade program might accomplish
this goal, it would have to address the specific linkage between
the polluting state's facilities and the receiving state.The CAIR
made no attempt to measure these effects.Thus, as the court
put it, an Alabama source could purchase allowances to cover
all of its current emissions in compliance with the CAIR, but
it would still contribute to air quality standard violations in
Davidson, North Carolina.Thus, the CAIR, however sensible
in the aggregate, did not comply with Section 110.
On a related issue, the court held that "All the policy reasons
in the world" could not justify EPA'S method of identifying
sources that "interfere with maintenance" of compliance with
the ambient standards. EPA limited the rule to sources affecting areas projected to be out of compliance at the time the rule
took effect. North Carolina argued that the rule must include
upwind states whose pollution would reach areas projected
to barely meet attainment standards at the time the rule took
effect. EPA argued as a matter of policy that its position would
eliminate the downwind state's incentive to allow pollution to increase to the level of the ambient standard. Despite
a seemingly sensible policy concern, the court held that in
order to give independent meaning to the term "interference
with maintenance," EPA must require control beyond merely
preventing violations of the ambient standards.
In these and other areas, the court stringently applied
the statutory language to defeat EPA's efforts.The central
problem was that EPA pursued a regional solution to a
problem addressed by the statute as involving conflicts between
particular states. EPA could not shoehorn the square peg of
regionalism into the round hole of state-by-state relationships.
Despite this seeming inflexibility, the court deferred to EPA's
3
decision to set an air quality threshold of 0.2 <<mu>>g/m
for certain particulates when it had originally proposed a
threshold of 0.15.Although EPA did not fully explain its choice
of the larger number, it had asked for comment on the issue
and had responded to some of the comments.The court
held that EPA's position was not wholly unsupported by the
record, hardly a demanding standard, and that EPA's choice
was reasonable.
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D.C. Circuit - Dissent's Literalism Strives to
Revive the Nondelegation Doctrine
Despite being battered even by Justice Scalia, ("the doctrine
of unconstitutional delegation ... is not an element readily
enforceable by the courts" Mistretta v.US., 488 U.S. 361,415
(1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting)), the nondelegation doctrine
once again returns to the fray. In Michigan Gambling Opposition v.Kempthorne, 525 F3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (referred to as
"MichGO"),JudgeJanice Rogers Brown in dissent articulates
limiting principles that could well revive the doctrine.
In MichGO, the D.C. Circuit upheld the action of the
Deparnnent of the Interior in taking 147 acres in trust for an
Indian tribe to operate a casino. In so doing, the majority found
no violation of either the National Environmental Policy Act
or the nondelegation doctrine.As to the latter, the majority
held that the statutory authority to obtain lands "for Indians"
was no broader than other statutes authorizing regulation "in
the public interest," a standard previously held to comply with
the nondelegation doctrine. In so doing, the majority emphasized that the "statutory and historical context" of the Indian
Reorganization Act and its legislative history established
an intelligible principle that the agency was to exercise this
authority to further Indian economic development and selfgovernance.
Judge Brown disagreed. Rejecting the majority's reasoning
as a "tautology on steroids," she could not, applying ordinary
tools of statutory construction, find any intelligible limits in
the statute. In her view, when a standard is not ambiguous, but
absent, it cannot be derived from the legislative history or other
tools of construction."Even if a mood of self-sufficiency can
be said to permeate" the statute, such mood is not a standard to
guide an agency's decisions. Having been given by the statutory
language unfettered authority to acquire land for Indians "in
his discretion," the Secretary unambiguously had unbounded
discretion.
Judge Brown's approach would not so much make the
nondelegation doctrine more enforceable as it would significandy reduce the arsenal of weapons available to an agency
defending against a nondelegation attack.The more the court's
analysis is limited to the particular statutory language (e.g.,"for
Indians" and "in his discretion" in this case), the more difficult it
will become to find the intelligible purpose that has often been
available in the legislative history.

9th Circuit Takes a Softer "Hard Look" at

Forest Service Methodology
Overruling its prior decision in Ecology Center,Inc. v.Austin,
430 F3d 1057 (9th Cir.2005), the 9 ' Circuit in Lands Council
v.McNair,2008WL 2640001 (9a' Cir. 2008) (Lands Council II),
upheld a Forest Service forest-thinning project against challenges to the reliability of the agency's scientific methodology
and to the agency's consideration of uncertainty.The court's
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succinct summary signals a shift to a softer "hard look" in
reviewing agency judgments:
In essence, Lands Council asks this court to act as a panel of
scientists that instructs the Forest Service how to validate its
hypotheses regarding wildlife viability, chooses among scientific studies in determining whether the Forest Service has
complied with the underlying Forest Plan, and orders the
agency to explain every possible scientific uncertainty.As we
will explain, this is not a proper role for a federal appellate
court. But Lands Council's arguments illustrate how, in recent
years, our environmental jurisprudence has, at times, shifted
away from the appropriate standard of review and could be
read to suggest that this court should play such a role.
The Lands Council challenged the Forest Service's proposal to
conduct selective logging and thinning in the Mission Brush
area, arguing that the agency had failed to demonstrate the
reliability of its conclusions about the effect of the project on
flanmnulated owl populations because the agency had not verified its predictions with on-the-ground analysis.The Lands
Council relied upon Ecology Center,which had articulated a rule
requiring such verification. Ecology Center,in turn, had relied
upon a previous decision involving the Lands Council (Lands
Council I), in which the court had required on-the ground
verification as to certain soil analysis.
In Lands Council II, the 9' Circuit emphasized at length the
need for non-scientist judges to defer to an agency's technical judgment and to avoid discussion of fine-grained technical
issues. Since the agency had used some studies that it considered reliable, had done some on-the-ground analysis, and could
point to studies supporting its conclusions about the owls, that
was enough despite conclusions as to possible disruptions.The
court accepted a "habitat as proxy" approach to making the
judgment that the habitat would enhance the owl population
even though some cases had rejected "habitat as proxy" on
particular facts. In upholding the agency's treatment of uncertainty, the court held that the agency did not have to discuss
every uncertainty, but it did have to respond to comments.The
ultimate lesson of this decision is twofold: (1) the courts' review
of agency technical decisions should be highly deferential, and
(2) a judgment about whether an agency action is arbitrary and
capricious depends upon the particular facts, not upon some
principle articulated in a previous decision (e.g., Ecology Center
or Lands Council I) involving arguably similar facts.

D.C. Circuit - Agency Head Deviation from Prior
Staff Decisions Not Arbitrary and Capricious
Much to practitioners' dismay, agency heads sometimes take
actions that are inconsistent with actions that the agency staff
had previously taken with respect to the same issues.That was
the source of Comcast's complaint about the FCC's denial of a
request for a waiver of certain requirements.
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As directed by Congress, the FCC issued regulations requiring the security aspects of direct broadcast receivers (i.e. the
means of assuring receipt of certain broadcasts but not others)
to be distinct from other aspects of such receivers (e.g., channel
tuners), and banning integrated boxes that provided both finctions.The limitations are designed to create a market for the
new devices.The agency authorized waivers of the ban for
"low cost, limited capability" boxes. During the regulatory
process, the FCC staff issued waivers for some integrated boxes.
When Comcast sought a waiver for its own integrated boxes
- with the lowest cost on the market and some exactly the
same as those for which waivers had previously been issued by
the Media Bureau of the FCC - the Media Bureau denied the
request on the ground that Comcast's box did not meet the
waiver criteria. Comcast appealed to the Commission itself,
which confirmed the denial.
In Comcast Corp. v.FCC,526 F3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the
D.C. Circuit rejected Comcast's argument that inconsistency
between the agency's waiver decisions rendered the denial
arbitrary and capricious. Emphasizing its "well-established
view that an agency is not bound by the actions of its staff if
the agency has not endorsed those actions," the court refused
to insist that the FCCjustify the differential treatment.The
central point was that the agency itself (the Commissioners in
this case) is not bound by the earlier actions of its staff. Comcast
complained that it had had no incentive to appeal the earlier
waiver grants because it had agreed with those outcomes, but
this was irrelevant.Without appeals from the earlier waiver
grants the court could not know whether the Commissioners
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8th Circuit - No Absolute Right to Cross-Examination in Formal Agency Adjudication
In Richardson v.Perales,402 U.S. 389 (1971), the Supreme
Court held that hearsay reports from various physicians could
constitute substantial evidence to support a conclusion that a
claimant is not disabled.The Court created an ambiguity by
noting that the claimant in that case had not subpoenaed the
physicians in question, so he could not complain of inability to
cross-examine them with respect to their reports. In Passmore v.
Astrue, 533 F3d 658 (8"' Cir. 2008), a disability claimant sought
to exploit this opening by requesting a subpoena of and opportunity to cross-examine a reporting physician.When the ALJ
denied the subpoena and the claim,Astrue argued that he had
an absolute right to cross-examine, relying upon a 5 h Circuit
decision to that effect.
The 8' Circuit, howeverjoined the 6 ,h Circuit in rejecting this argument. First, the court noted that the applicable
regulations authorized cross-examination "when reasonably
necessary," so there was no regulatory basis for Astrue's claim.
Second, the court applied a Mathews balancing test to conclude
that due process did not require the right to cross-examination
on the particular facts. Finally, the court concluded for essentially the same reasons that denial of cross-examination was not
an abuse of discretion. CD

continuedfrom page 22

activity that produced the laundered funds." Id. at 2044 (J.Alito,
dissenting).
Beyond the basics of how to interpret statutes, the Supreme
Court also considered the role of federalism and other tools
of statutory interpretation in Florida Department of Revenue v.
Piccadilly Cafeterias,Inc.,- U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2326 (June 16,
2008).This 7-2 decision (ustices Breyer and Stevens dissented)
involved the Bankruptcy Code's provision exempting assets
transferred under a plan confirmed under Chapter 11 of the
Code from the imposition of stamp taxes and similar taxes.
Specifically, the Court held that the tax exemption does not
apply until after the plan is confirmed.
The Court considered a number of interpretive tools in
reaching this conclusion. For example, while emphasizing that
"a subchapter heading cannot substitute for the operative test
of
the statute," the Court nevertheless noted that "statutory itles
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would have agreed with those decisions. Unchallenged staff
decisions are simply not agency precedent and cannot create
inconsistency with a later decision by the head of the agency.

and section headings 'are tools available for the resolution of
a doubt about the meaning of a statute."' Id. at 2336 (citations
omitted). Moreover, the Court approved Florida's invocation
of three canons of statutory construction. First, Florida invoked
the canon that"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt
that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change."
Id. (quoting Lorillard v.Pons, 434 U.S. 575,580-81 (1978)).
Second, Florida argued that courts should "proceed carefully
when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that
Congress has not clearly expressed." Id. at 2336-37 (citations
omitted). Finally,"Florida notes that the canon also discourages
federal interference with the administration of a State's taxation
scheme." Id. at 2337.As such, the Court remains consistent in its
use of federalism principles to interpret federal statutes. C)
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Florida Amends APA to Further Discourage Unadopted Rules
By Larry Sellers*
Last year, the Florida Legislature approved a number of
changes to Florida's Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'
Among other things, the 2007 bill would have provided for
additional restrictions on the use of unadopted rules, based
largely on recommendations by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC).The Governor vetoed this measure
because of concerns regarding unintended consequences.
Specifically, the Governor's veto letter mentioned the provision
in the bill that would have limited an agency's authority to rely
on unadopted statements that are subject to pending legal challenges.
Currently, agencies respond to challenges to unadopted
statements by initiating a rulemaking to adopt the challenged
statement because the initiation of such rulemaking usually
results in a stay of the challenge, and the subsequent adoption
of the rule moots the challenge. In such cases, the agency may
continue to rely upon the challenged statement if the statement meets the requirement in s. 120.57(1)(e) that the agency
demonstrate -"prove up"- that the unadopted rule is not
an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and that the
rule is not being applied without due notice.
The 2007 bill would have made significant changes to these
provisions. In particular, it provided that upon thefiling of a
petition for administrative determination that an agency statement violates the rulemaking requirement, the agency must
inimediately discontinue all reliance upon the statement or any
substantially sinilar statement as a basis for agency action until
one of four specified events occurred.This feature of the 2007
bill proved to be the most controversial, and the Governor
specifically mentioned it in his veto message, claiming that
"such a provision amounts to an injunction against the agency
in the absence of any allegation of harm by the challenger and
halts enforcement or implementation of laws."As a result, this
provision was deleted.
During the 2008 Regular Session that ended in early May,
the Legislature revised the measure to resolve the Governor's
concerns and enacted SB 704, the Open Government Act.
Much of the Act reflects the Legislature's continuing effort to
assert its preference that agencies adopt their policies pursuant
to the rulemaking procedures in the APA.This preference is
based on the Legislature's view that key goals of the APA are to
combat "phantom government" by providing notice of agency
policy, encouraging public participation in the development
of that policy, and ensuring legislative oversight of delegated
* Partner, Holland & Knight LLPTallahassee, FL.

authority. Here are some of the highlights relating to unadopted
statements meeting the definition of a "rule".
Reliance on Unadopted Rules Prohibited.Effective January 1,
2009, the Act provides that an agency or an administrative law
judge may not base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule.
Exceptionfor Recently-Enacted Statutes.The Act carves out
an exception requested by the Governor's office that allows
an agency's action to be based on unadopted rules, subject to
review of the administrative lawjudge, if an agency demonstrates: (1) that the statute being implemented directs it to adopt
rules, (2) that the agency has not had time to adopt those rules
because the requirement was so recently enacted, and (3) that
the agency has initiated rulemaking and is proceeding expeditiously and in good faith to adopt the required rules.
Revised Proceduresfor Staying Challenges.The Act provides that
upon notification to the administrative law judge before final
hearing that the agency has published a notice of rulemaking,
such notice shall automatically operate as a stay of proceedings
pending adoption of the statement as a rule.The administrative law judge may vacate the stay for good cause shown. Such
a stay shall remain in effect so long as the agency is proceeding
expeditiously and in good faith to adopt the challenged statement as a rule.
Revised Attorney's Fees.While the APA always has included a
limit on the attorney's fees that may be awarded in cases involving challenges to proposed or existing rules, there is no limit on
attorney's fees that may be awarded in cases involving challenges to unadoptedrules. However, agencies typically avoided
the risk of paying attorney's fees in such cases by initiating a
rulemaking to adopt the challenged unadopted statement.
Effective January 1, 2009, the Act makes three notable changes
to the provision governing attorney's fees in cases involving
challenges to unadoptedrules.
First, the Act provides that attorney's fees and costs may be
awarded in challenges to unadopted statements only upon a
finding that the agency received notice that the statement may
constitute an unadopted rule at least 30 days before the petition was filed and that the agency failed to publish the required
notice of rulemaking that addresses this statement within that
30-day period.
Second, the Act provides that, if prior to the final hearing (but
after the 30-day notice described above) the agency initiates a
rulemaking and requests a stay of the proceedings pending the
rulemaking, the administrative law judge shall award reasonable
costs and reasonable attorney's fees accrued by the petitioner
prior to the date the agency published notice of rulemaking,
unless the agency proves that it did not knov and should not
have known that this statement was an unadopted rule. Given
the new 30-day notice requirement, it may be quite difficult for

See HB 7183 (2007) (vetoed June 27, 2007). For a summary of
the 2007 bill, see Larry Sellers, FloridaAmendsAPA,,Vol. 32 ADMIN. &
R.EG. L NEWS, No. 4 at 27-28 (Summer 2007) .
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and Events
New Section Director
The Section welcomes Anne Kiefer as its new Section Director, replacing Kim Knight who has moved on to the Dispute
Resolution Section. Anne's background includes more than
10 years in a comparable role at a trade association in Chicago,
the Steel Tank Institute and Steel Plate Fabricators Association.
She has a Bachelor's Degree in Management, and experience
with administration and licensing, membership recruitment and
retention, meetings and education management, and technology
management.

Mary C. Lawton Award
Peggy R. Mastroianni is the winner of the 2008 Mary C.
Lawton Award for Outstanding Government Service. Peggy is
associate legal counsel in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
at the Equal Opportunity Commission. Peggy has headed the
OLC on several occasions due to vacancies at the top. Peggy is
best known for her extensive contributions to the development
of regulations and guidance documents on the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Scholarship Award
Reuel E. Schiller, Professor of Law, University of Californa, Hastings College of the Law, is the winner of the Section's
2007 Scholarship Award for his article, The Era of Deference:
Courts,Expertise, and the Emergence of New DealAdministrative
Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. 399 (2007).The article examines the
effect Roosevelt's judicial appointees had in the development of
modern administrative law, particularly the development of the
doctrine ofjudicial deference.

NYC Corporation Counsel Remarks
Thefollowing are excerptsfrom a speech given at the Annual Meeting by
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of Newv York.
If you listened closely to the comnents introducing me you
might have asked yourselves: "Why in the world is this guy
Cardozo speaking to us? He never practiced before a federal
administrative agency in his life.Where is his experience before
the SEC or the FTC or HUD or any of the other alphabet
soup agencies in DC before whom we practice? What the heck
does representing Mayor Bloomberg or the City of NewYork,
have to do with administrative law?"
Well the fact is that, while I certainly can't claim to be an
administrative law expert, a significant part of the work of
the NewYork City Corporation Counsel's Office deals with
administrative law. * * *
For NewYorkers and other city dwellers, administrative
law is nothing less than the enforcement of rules that shape
the quality of every day life. Parking tickets, waste disposal, air
pollution, noise, building and fire safety, and taxes are just a few
examples. How administrative disputes in these and numerous
other areas are resolved has a direct and immediate impact on
the quality of life of everyday NewYorkers. * * * Each year
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the City holds approximately one million hearings - live or
by mail -for parking violations.That's right, I said one million
hearings. Each year in NewYork City there are approximately
200,000 administrative hearings for quality of life violations
such as street cleanliness, pollution, and fire violations. Last year
the City's Office ofAdministrative Trials and Hearings, which
conducts administrative hearings for other City agencies, such
as disputes between City agencies and city employees, resolved
by trial or settlement almost 2,000 cases. In 2007, the CityTax
Commission, which hears challenges to real estate tax assessments, reviewed 42,118 applications seeking reductions in
assessed values.The value of the properties for which reductions
were sought totaled over $120 billion. * * *
In the modern era, NewYork City, like most cities across the
country, has delegated to administrative tribunals appeals of
zoning determinations, employee disciplinary decisions, and
other issues. But over time NewYork City, and to some extent
other municipalities as well, have created other administrative
tribunals that deal with matters formerly handled in the criminal,
and to some extent the civil, courts.
Starting in the 1970s, the City recognized that many issues,
primarily those involving quality of life complaints, were
overwhelming the dockets of already overburdened courts. In
response, the City moved many issues that traditionally had
been resolved in the City's criminal courts into administrative
law tribunals. Of particular note, the City established the
misleadingly titled Environmental Control Board, which
handles not only environmental complaints such as noise and
air pollution, but also the gamut of quality of life violations,
such as street cleanliness, waste disposal, and fire, building, and
parks violations.
Another innovation was the creation of a central tribunal
where filly independent administrative judges hear cases from
other agencies. In 1979 the City became the first municipality
in the country to create such a central tribunal. Central panels
have become a feature of modern administrative law and now
exist in about half of the states in the country and in NewYork
City, Chicago, and the District of Columbia. NewYork City's
Office ofAdministrative Trials and Hearings began by handling
disciplinary and discrimination decisions involving most of the
City's approximately 300,000 city employees and now hears
a wide array of cases from other agencies, such as contracts,
licenses, and vehicle forfeitures. * * *
Unfortunately, we have become a victim of our own success.
The literally hundreds of thousands of cases transferred from
the criminal courts no longer clog court dockets.And the flexibility of a non-criminal proceeding frequently means that the
deterrent effect of an administrative sanction is far preferable
and fairer to all concerned to a conviction in criminal court.
But these cases and the large number of other administrative
continued on next page
Administrative and Regulatory Law News

Administrative and Regulatory Law News

Section News and Events

continuedfrom previous page

cases place an enormous burden on the administrative tribunals and
the over 500 City administrative law judges.
The volume of matters faced by these local administrative agencies raises three pressing challenges: voluminous case loads, ethical
conduct by adninistrative judges and hearing officers,
and the rights of pro se litigants.A fundamental principal underlying
all these issues and related aspects of administrative law in cities is
due process.
A cousin of mine, whom some of you may have heard of, Benjanin Cardozo, has instructed us, in essence, that "due process is the
process that is due." In all due respect to cousin Ben, that is not
very helpful guidance. It certainly does not tell us what due process
means in an administrative law system with the volume in New
York City.
Obviously, the process that is due for a small parking ticket is
less extensive than for a more complicated case with more severe
consequences. But it is important to keep in mind that for most
NewYorkers, administrative tribunals are the only way they interact
with City government.The Administrative Law Judge or hearing
officer thus becomes the face ofjustice in the city.The litigant at
risk of paying a parking or noise pollution fine, or being assessed
higher taxes, must feel and know that he or she is being afforded due
process.
The City has sought to protect due process by statute.The New
York City Charter sets minimum standards of due process for all
City administrative tribunals, including, for example, notice of
hearings, findings of fact based solely on the record, and a written
decision. Parties have the right to a hearing with due process,
including the opportunity to be represented by counsel, issue
subpoenas, call witnesses, cross examine, and present oral and
written arguments.
Technology is obviously one way to address volume. *** Today
NewYorkers can contest parking tickets by mail or on line. Eventually, proceedings should be able to be conducted back and forth via
the internet. Obviously modern technology, properly utilized, offers
numerous other ways to deal with the volume. But no matter how
efficient the administrative proceeding is, there must be an assurance
that the administrative law judge or hearing officer is fair and unbiased. * * *
Last year the City adopted a Code of Conduct providing
uniform rules for administrative law judges that enhance accountability and increase professionalism. Since most city administrative
law judges and hearing officers work part time or on a per diem
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basis the Code of Conduct addresses questions such as:What can
administrative law judges and hearing officers do when not serving
as a judicial officer? Can they be engaged in politics? Are they
limited in the kinds of outside legal work they can undertake? * * *
These rules are a good start.And given the economic realities cities
face, and the need to have part time, not fill time, administrative
judges, is it necessary - and is it realistic - to place more ethical
restrictions on ALJs limiting what they can do when not serving
as administrative judges? The organized bar, I suggest, should be
looking at the issue and offering constructive advice. ***
Since most local administrative proceedings typically involve
small sums, it follows that most litigants represent themselves.
Indeed, one benefit of proceedings before adninistrative tribunals,
as distinct from the criminal courts, is that they are less formal and
intimidating and more readily allow a pro se litigant to give an effective presentation
At the same time, however, an additional responsibility is placed
on the administrative law judge or hearing officer to ensure that
the pro se litigant receives due process.The City's recently adopted
Code of Conduct for administrative judges establishes an affirmative responsibility for the administrative law judge or hearing officer
to ensure that pro se litigants have the opportunity to present their
cases.
In addition, the Code of Conduct suggests a number of appropriate steps to advance a pro se litigant's ability to be heard, such as
requiring the ALJ to explain the nature and process of the hearing
and to question witnesses to elicit general information and to obtain
clarification.
Should more be done to safeguard the rights of pro se litigants
in administrative proceedings? Can this be done without making
the administrative process even more bureaucratic and even more
expensive to the municipality? Scrutiny from the outside world, I
suggest, would help us answer these questions.
I want to conclude with these final thoughts.
It is easy to underestimate the importance of municipal administrative law.Rarely, if ever, will a city's administrative tribunal decide
one case that is worth billions, or that will make the front page
headlines of the day. But taken together the millions of cases heard
by administrative tribunals are responsible for making America's
cities and their residents healthier, safer and more prosperous.
The questions I raised tonight deserve the serious attention of
acadenics and the bar. I hope you will lead in that endeavor.
Thank you.. C)
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an agency to make such a showing.An award of attorney's fees
under this new provision may not exceed $50,000.
The Act also makes changes that are designed to provide for an
award of attorney's fees if the agency initiates rulemaking, but the
proposed rule addressing the challenged statement is determined to
be invalid.
Third, the Act provides that, if the agency prevails in the proceedings, the administrative law judge or appellate court shall award
reasonable costs and attorney's fees against the party if (1) the party
participated in the proceedings for an improper purpose; or (2) the
party or the party's attorney knew or should have known that a
claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish
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the claim or would not be supported by the application of thenexisting law to those material facts.This latter ground was added at
the request of the Governor's office in an effort to "close the gap"
between the different attorney's fees standards that apply depending
upon whether the agency or the challenger is the prevailing party.

Conclusion
Governor Crist signed the Open Government Act into law on
June 10, 2008. In remains to be seen whether the Act strikes the
right balance between an agency's need to issue informal guidance documents and the public's right to have a say in the rules that
govern their affairs.. C)
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